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FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 413-415
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RULEMAKING
PREEMINENCE
ROSANNA CAVALLARO*
This Article considers Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415, which govern
admissibility of similar crimes evidence in sexual assault and child
molestation cases in federal courts. Enacted by Congress in 1995 despite
the objections of the Judicial Conference, the American Bar Association,
and many legal scholars, and in contravention of the established process
for promulgating rules of procedure and evidence set out in the Rules
Enabling Act, these rules carve an exception out of the rule against the use
ofpropensity evidence where the acts are sexual in nature. In the ten years
that the rules have been in effect, the issue that has emerged is the proper
scope of trial court discretion to exclude similar acts evidence in sexual
assault cases under the general supervisory authority of Rule 403. The
issue invites a broader consideration of which branch of government ought
to have primacy in the area of evidence rulemaking. Recent years have
seen a contraction in the scope of congressional delegation contained in the
Rules Enabling Act. This Article considers the question of which branch
should enjoy rulemaking preeminence from the perspective not of power,
but of institutional competence, considering the nature and purpose of
particular evidentiary rules rather than determining the question
categorically. I conclude that the rules regarding similar acts involve
interests that are fundamentally judicial rather than legislative, and that,
accordingly, courts should implement a robust Rule 403 balancing inquiry
when presented with similar acts evidence under Rules 413-415.
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that, in response to a growing public perception that
homicides were too frequently going unpunished,1 and that rules of
* Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School; J.D., Harvard Law School (1986);
A.B., Harvard College (1983). Thanks to Eric Blumenson, David Poole, and to Deans
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evidence unreasonably insulated juries from the graphic horror of the crime
of murder,2 Congress passed a statute that amended the Federal Rules of
Evidence to provide as follows:
Rule 416. Autopsy Photos
Any photograph of the body of a victim of an alleged homicide, including any
photograph taken during a medical examination, shall be admissible on any matter to
which it is relevant.
How would autopsy photos offered at a homicide trial after the effective
date of this amendment be treated by the trial court?3 What would be the
1 Such a sentiment is the subtext of much of the victims' rights legislation that has been
enacted over the last quarter century. See, e.g, Douglas E. Beloof & Paul G. Cassell, The
Crime Victim's Right to Attend the Trial: The Reascendant National Consensus, 9 LEWIS &
CLARK L. Rnv. 481, 503-17 (2005) (reviewing victims' rights statutes and the history of
victim participation at trials); John W. Gillis & Douglas E. Beloof, The Next Step for a
Maturing Victim Rights Movement: Enforcing Crime Victim Rights in the Courts, 33
McGEORGE L. REv. 689, 690 (2002) (noting that the "modem Crime Victims' Rights
Movement began thirty years ago" and that "[s]ince 1982, thousands of federal and state
statutes governing the rights and interests of crime victims have been enacted, and thirty-two
states have amended their constitutions to guarantee basic rights for crime victims"); Katie
Long, Note, Community Input at Sentencing: Victim's Right or Victim 's Revenge, 75 B.U. L.
REv. 187, 188 (1995) (noting that there has been "a growing battle for control of the criminal
justice system" due in part to "intensifying outrage over crime and increasing skepticism
about the efficacy of the criminal justice system").
2 See, e.g., State v. Bocharski, 22 P.3d 43, 49 (Ariz. 2001) (reviewing trial court's
exercise of discretion to admit six "gruesome, highly inflammatory" autopsy photos and
noting that judges "have an obligation to weigh the prejudice caused by a gruesome picture
against its probative value").
Recent scholarship also suggests that an increased legislative interest in autopsy photos
might result from the so-called "CSI effect," which heightens juror expectations of viewing
scientific and other forensic evidence at trial. See, e.g., United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d
313, 355 n.39 (5th Cir. 2007) ("The 'CSI effect' is a term that legal authorities and the mass
media have coined to describe a supposed influence that watching the television show CSI:
Crime Scene Investigation has on juror behavior. Some have claimed that jurors who see the
high-quality forensic evidence presented on CSI raise their standards in real trials, in which
actual evidence is typically more flawed and uncertain." (citing Tom R. Tyler, Viewing CSI
and the Threshold of Guilt: Managing Truth and Justice in Reality and Fiction, 115 YALE
L.J. 1050 (2006) (explaining that the existence of a "CSI effect" is plausible but has not been
proven empirically))); see also Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 188 (1997)
("[B]eyond the power of conventional evidence to support allegations and give life to the
moral underpinnings of law's claims, there lies the need for evidence in all its particularity to
satisfy the jurors' expectations about what proper proof should be.").
3 An imperfect analogy may be made to Oklahoma's 2002 legislation mandating the
admissibility of "in-life" photographs of homicide victims, reversing the prior practice of
excluding such photos as unfairly prejudicial under Oklahoma's version of Rule 403. See
Act of Mar. 19, 2003, ch. 3, § 15, 2003 Okla. Sess. Laws 7, 26-27 (codified at tit. 12 Okla.
Stat. § 2403); Liesa L. Richter, Evidence: Is Oklahoma Balancing the Scales of Justice by
Tying the Hands of Trial Judges?: The 2002 Amendment to Section 2403 of the Oklahoma
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nature and scope of the trial court's review of those photos under Federal
Rule of Evidence 403?4 Are the answers to these questions determinable
exclusively by reference to the language of the amended rule, or the
language of the entire body of rules of evidence?5 Could the answers be
found by reference to the legislative history of the amendment, and if so,
what weight would the unanimous opposition of the judiciary and the bar
have in that analysis? 6 How should the fact of congressional amendment-
as opposed to judicial amendment-of the rules affect the longstanding
practice of weighing the probative value of all relevant evidence against the
danger of unfair prejudice posed by that evidence?
Although no such amendment has, in fact, been enacted, it would be
surprising if trial courts implementing such a rule did not resist, to some
degree, congressional imposition of a categorical approach to admissibility
in a context in which individualized determinations of probativeness and
prejudice by a trial judge have been the norm. It would be still more
surprising if trial courts began routinely admitting autopsy photos on the
theory that the new rule expressed an "underlying legislative
judgment ... that [such evidence] is normally not outweighed by any risk
of prejudice or other adverse effects." 7  Most surprising would be the
Evidence Code Mandating Admission of In-Life Victim Photographs in Homicide Cases, 56
OKLA. L. REv. 383, 385 (2003) (arguing that the new rule "undermines the historical
discretion of the trial judge" under Oklahoma's version of Rule 403).
4 Rule 403 provides that "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EVID. 403.
5 For some discussions of how to interpret the Federal Rules of Evidence, see Edward R.
Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After Sixteen Years-The Effect
of "Plain Meaning" Jurisprudence, the Need for an Advisory Committee on the Rules of
Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective Revision of the Rules, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 857
(1992); Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Brief Defense of the Supreme Court's Approach to the
Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 27 IND. L. REv. 267 (1993); Eileen A.
Scallen, Classical Rhetoric, Practical Reasoning, and the Law of Evidence, 44 AM. U. L.
REv. 1717 (1995).
6 See infra Part V (noting that courts considering Rules 413-415 have focused on the
testimony of its sponsors and not on the unanimous opposition of bench and bar); see also
Randolph N. Jonakait, Text, Texts, or Ad Hoc Determinations: Interpretation of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 71 IND. L.J. 551, 553 (1996) ("Although it often nods at a textualist
approach, the Court does not treat the Federal Rules of Evidence as a text. Instead, the Court
interprets them too often as if the Rules were only a collection of isolated provisions, as if
they were only a compilation of segregated texts.").
7 United States v. Mound, 149 F.3d 799, 802 (8th Cir. 1988) (quoting 140 CONG. REC.
H8991 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of House sponsor Rep. Molinari) [hereinafter
Statement of Rep. Molinari]); see infra note 142 (citing additional cases in which courts
have given evidence offered under Rule 413-415 a presumption of probativeness); see also
Aviva Orenstein, Deviance, Due Process, and the False Promise of Federal Rule of
ROSANNA CA VALLARO
complete failure of reviewing courts to recognize the rule as a manifestation
of the now long-simmering feud between Congress and the courts over the
politics of evidence rulemaking.8
I pose this hypothetical because federal trial and appellate courts'
implementation of the rules relating to evidence of similar crimes in sexual
assault and child molestation cases 9 has produced precisely these surprising
outcomes.' 0 Like autopsy photos, evidence of similar crimes to prove
character or propensity has provided the paradigmatic context for the
exercise of judicial discretion under Rule 403 to exclude evidence that,
although relevant, is also highly prejudicial." Accordingly, a congressional
amendment that would, as Rules 413-415 have done, radically alter the
legal landscape and impose a rule of categorical admissibility for propensity
evidence poses many of the questions that the hypothetical rule regarding
autopsy photos might provoke.
Almost a dozen years into the life of the special Federal Rules of
Evidence governing the use of similar evidence in sexual assault cases,' 2
rules whose enactment by Congress was heatedly contested both
Evidence 403, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 1487, 1492 (2005) (characterizing trial and appellate
court review of Rule 413-415 evidence as "403-lite").
8 See generally Eileen A. Scallen, Analyzing "The Politics of [Evidence] Rulemaking,"
53 HASTINGS L.J. 843, 843-44 (2002) (noting that "recent changes to federal evidence law,
such as the addition of rules on the admissibility of a defendant's prior sexual
conduct,... have highlighted the political and controversial aspects of procedural
rulemaking").
9 Congress enacted Rules 413, 414, and 415 of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1994,
and they took effect on July 9, 1995. Rule 413 governs criminal cases "in which the
defendant is accused of an offense of sexual assault," a term defined by reference to sections
of the United States Code and analogous sections of state law. FED. R. EVID. 413(a), (d).
Similarly, Rule 414 applies to criminal cases "in which the defendant is accused of an
offense of child molestation," defined within the Rule. FED. R. EVID. 414. Rule 415 applies
to civil cases in which a claim "is predicated on a party's alleged commission of conduct
constituting an offense of sexual assault or child molestation.., as provided in Rule 413 and
Rule 414 of these rules." FED. R. EVID. 415.
10 See infra Part V (citing cases).
" See, e.g., Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 191-92 (1997) (finding it error to
admit evidence of defendant's prior felony conviction where other, less prejudicial evidence
was available for that proposition); Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988)
(noting the rules of evidence "generally prohibit the introduction of evidence of extrinsic
acts that might adversely reflect on the actor's character, unless that evidence bears upon a
relevant issue in the case such as motive, opportunity, or knowledge"); Michelson v. United
States, 335 U.S. 469, 489 (1948) ("General bad character, much less bad reputation, has not
yet become a criminal offense in our scheme.").
12 The new rules provide that such evidence is to be "admitted on any matter to which it
is relevant." FED. R. EVID. 413-415.
[Vol. 98
2007] STRUGGLE FOR RULEMAKING PREEMINENCE 35
substantively 13 and procedurally, 14 and whose rationale remains elusive,' 5
the battleground has shifted. The question now presented is not whether
such rules should be enacted, but how, in trials alleging sexual violence, the
13 See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE ON THE ADMISSION OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN CERTAIN SEXUAL MISCONDUCT
CASES (1994), 159 F.R.D. 51, 52-54 (1995), reprinted in GLEN WEISSENBERGER & JAMES J.
DUANE, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: RULES, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, COMMENTARY AND
AUTHORITY, app. A at 848-49 (2001) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE]
(recommending that "Congress... reconsider its decision on the policy questions underlying
the new rules"); see also David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, "Other Crimes" Evidence in
Sex Offense Cases, 78 MINN. L. REV. 529, 575, 582 (1994) (expressing "some ambivalence
on the authors' part" regarding proposed rules, but recommending "relax[ation of] the
exclusionary rule in acquaintance rape cases" and contending that "uncharged misconduct
evidence probably should be admissible in child abuse cases"); David J. Karp, Evidence of
Propensity and Probability in Sex Offense Cases and Other Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV 15
(1994). Mr. Karp, Senior Counsel, Office of Policy Development, United States Department
of Justice, described his remarks, presented to the Evidence Section of the Association of
American Law Schools in January 1994, as "a detailed account of the views of the legislative
sponsors and the administration concerning the... reform," and recited that they
"should... be considered an authoritative part of its legislative history." Id. at 15 n.*
(quoting Statement of Rep. Molinari, supra note 7)); see also 140 CONG. REC. 24799
(statement of principal Senate sponsor Sen. Robert Dole); Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Small
Contribution to the Debate over the Proposed Legislation Abolishing the Character
Evidence Prohibition in Sex Offense Prosecutions, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1125 (1993)
(critiquing proposed rules and the reasoning offered in their support by the Department of
Justice).
14 The new rules were enacted by Congress as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322 (1994), and were not the product of the
rulemaking process contemplated by the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1990). See
REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 13, at 849 (noting that "[c]onsideration of
Rules 413-415 by the Judicial Conference was specifically excepted from the exacting
review procedures set forth in the Rules Enabling Act"); see also infra Part II.A.2.
(comparing enactment of Rules 413-415 to the usual process for amending rules).
15 Other than a desire to see more convictions in sexual assault and child sexual abuse
cases, there is no persuasive rationale for treating similar crimes evidence in sexual offense
cases differently from similar crimes evidence in other categories of case. See REPORT OF
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 13, at 850 (noting that the concerns underlying them
"are already adequately addressed in the existing Federal Rules of Evidence"; that "the new
rules... are not supported by empirical evidence"; that the new rules "could diminish
significantly the protections that have safeguarded persons accused in criminal cases and
parties in civil cases against undue prejudice" and would result in "mini-trials within trials";
and that, if the new rules were construed to preclude the application of Rule 403 to similar
act evidence in sexual assault cases, "serious constitutional questions would arise"). See
generally Katharine K. Baker, Once a Rapist? Motivational Evidence and Relevancy in Rape
Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 563 (1997) (opposing rules from feminist perspective); James S.
Liebman, Proposed Evidence Rules 413 to 415-Some Problems and Recommendations, 20
U. DAYTON L. REV. 753, 756 (1995) (opposing rules as logically incoherent); Leonore M.J.
Simon, The Myth of Sex Offender Specialization: An Empirical Analysis, 23 NEw ENG. J. ON
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 387, 401 (1997) (opposing rules based upon empirical analysis).
But see Karp, supra note 13, at 15 (supporting rules).
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general supervisory authority of the trial court under Rule 403 intersects
with the broad congressional mandate to admit similar acts evidence of
prior sexual assault "on any matter to which it is relevant."' 6 The problem
can be approached in a number of ways, from one of ordinary statutory
construction 17 to one of constitutional due process. 18 This Article proposes
to consider trial and appellate court struggles to integrate the similar acts
rules with Rule 403 as an episode in the long history of conflicts rooted in
16 FED. R. EvID. 413.
17 See cases cited infra Part V. One source of guidance as to the interpretation of the new
rules has been the statement of the Bill's House sponsor, Rep. Susan Molinari, that "the
general standards of the rules of evidence will continue to apply, including the restrictions on
hearsay evidence and the court's authority under Evidence Rule 403 to exclude evidence
whose probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect." 140 CONG. REC.
23603 (1994). At the time of the amendments' enactment, the availability of review under
Rule 403 was not perfectly clear. See, e.g., Bryden & Park, supra note 13, at 566 ("Whether
exclusion under Rule 403 would still be available to an accused seeking to challenge the
admissibility of [similar acts] evidence [offered under Rules 413-415] is unclear. The
proposed rules do not mention Rule 403, and one could plausibly construe the text of the bill
to create an exception to the rule. Instead of saying that the evidence 'may' be admissible,
as in Rule 404(b), the language of the proposed rules reads that the sexual history evidence
'is' admissible, and that jurors may consider the evidence 'on any matter to which it is
relevant."'). Since its implementation, however, courts have uniformly concluded that Rule
403 applies to evidence offered under Rules 413-415. See, e.g., United States v. Enjady, 134
F.3d 1427, 1431 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting that "we agree with the Eighth Circuit that
adoption of this rule without any exclusion or amendment to Rule 403 makes Rule 403
applicable, as it is to other rules of evidence" (citing United States v. Sumner, 119 F.3d 658,
661-62 (8th Cir. 1997))); United States v. Mound, 149 F.3d 799, 801 (8th Cir. 1988)
(approving 10th Circuit holding in Enjady that "subject to the protections of Rule 403, Rule
413 did not violate the Due Process Clause").
18 See, e.g., Orenstein, supra note 7, at 1492-93 (arguing that Rule 403 is a bulwark
against encroachment on due process values and that, to the extent that Rules 413-415 are
construed to preclude a robust application of 403, they are constitutionally unsound). But
see id. at 1515 (noting that "although entertaining the argument, courts have uniformly
rejected such due process challenges to Rule 413 and Rule 414" (citing, inter alia, United
States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 881-83 (10th Cir. 1998); Mound, 149 F.3d at 801)); see also
Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 (1990) (holding that use of similar acts evidence
pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) does not violate the due process or double
jeopardy clause of the Constitution, even where evidence relates to conduct for which
defendant has been acquitted). The Supreme Court's treatment of uncharged crimes in
criminal cases under the due process clause has been somewhat uneven. Compare Apprendi
v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (finding sentence enhancement based upon uncharged
acts unconstitutionally violated defendant's Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury and proof
beyond a reasonable doubt), and Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988)
(requiring jury in criminal case to find similar act only to a preponderance in order to
consider it under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)), with Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554,
564 (1967) (rejecting due process challenge to Texas habitual criminal statute that permitted
introduction of evidence of similar crimes).
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norms of institutional competency and separation of powers.'
9
Interestingly, the decisional law that has emerged since implementation of
the special similar crimes rules demonstrates a very limited degree of
judicial resistance to the reassertion of legislative power in this traditionally
and structurally judicial space.20  This level of resistance is somewhat
surprising given the long history of judicial primacy in the area of
procedural rulemaking, as well as particular perceptions of institutional
competency that these special similar acts rules are perceived to
undermine.2' Whereas there are examples of legislative resistance to
judicial encroachment on peculiarly legislative functions,22  and of
19 As the Supreme Court observed in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 575-76
(1995) (citations omitted):
Of the various structural elements in the Constitution, separation of powers, checks and balances,
judicial review, and federalism, only concerning the last does there seem to be much uncertainty
respecting the existence, and the content, of standards that allow the Judiciary to play a
significant role in maintaining the design contemplated by the Framers. Although the resolution
of specific cases has proved difficult, we have derived from the Constitution workable standards
to assist in preserving separation of powers and checks and balances. These standards are by
now well accepted. Judicial review is also established beyond question, and though we may
differ when applying its principles, its legitimacy is undoubted.
See also Linda S. Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking: The Civil Justice Reform Act and
Separation of Powers, 77 MINN. L. REv. 1283, 1299 (1993) (suggesting that cases involving
the separation of powers tension between the legislative and judicial branches "tend to be
more factually complicated and doctrinally elusive than those involving the executive
branch" and require a functional rather than a formal approach to constitutional analysis).
Professor Mullenix suggests that Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-74 (1989),
challenging the validity of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1988, is the most apposite Supreme
Court decision on the question of Congress's authority to limit the rulemaking power of the
judiciary. Mullenix, supra, at 1310-11. Although the Mistretta Court upheld the Sentencing
Reform Act, Mullenix argues that a different result should be reached on the Civil Justice
Reform Act since it unconstitutionally usurps judicial power to control judicial procedure by
promulgating procedural rules. Id. at 1297 ("In enacting the Civil Justice Reform Act, then,
Congress impermissibly removed most, if not all of the essential attributes of rulemaking
power from Article III judges and vested that power in non-Article III adjuncts to the
court.").
20 See discussion of cases infra Part V.
21 See cases infra Part V; see also Orenstein, supra note 7, at 1492 (noting that "by
relying on the legislative history of the new rules and announcing a presumption of
admissibility, courts have forsaken the traditional operation of Rule 403"). But see United
States v. Mound, 149 F.3d 799 (8th Cir. 1998) (constraining 403 review on the ground that
Rules 413-415 instruct courts to adopt a broad presumption of admissibility).
22 See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63 (invalidating Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1702, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat.) 4844, 4844-45 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 922(q) (2005)), as beyond congressional power under the commerce clause, due in
part to the Court's conclusion that, as the Government conceded, "[n]either the statute nor its
legislative history contain[s] express congressional findings regarding the effects upon
interstate commerce of gun possession in a school zone," and that, "to the extent that
congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity
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legislative and judicial resistance to the assertion of executive power in
spheres of judicial23 and legislative authority, 24 so here one might expect
courts to resist the congressional effort to strip them of their delegated
authority to determine and construct the rules of admissibility in
adjudicatory proceedings. This expectation is heightened by the subject
matter of the rules enacted by Congress, since similar acts evidence has
long been an area in which fact-specific weighing by an experienced trial
judge has been deemed essential to a fair trial.26
in question substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no such substantial effect
was visible to the naked eye, they are lacking here").
23 See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat'l Sec. Admin., 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich.
2006) (holding that a secret Bush administration program to intercept the international
telephone and internet communications of persons and organizations within the United
States without judicial approval violates First and Fourth Amendments).
24 See, e.g., Adam Cohen, Congress, the Constitution and War: The Limits on
Presidential Power, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2007, at A18 ("[W]e may be headed toward a
constitutional clash, with the administration trying to read powers into the Constitution-as
it has with its 'enemy combatant' doctrine and presidential 'signing statements'-that the
Founders did not put there. The Constitution's drafters were intent on balancing power so no
one branch could drift toward despotism. The system of checks and balances that runs
through the document divides the war power between the president and Congress.");
Reuters, National Briefing Washington: Senator to Challenge "Signing Statements," N.Y.
TIMES, July 25, 2006, at A16 (reporting that "Senator Arlen Specter said he would challenge
President Bush's practice of issuing 'signing statements' through which he claims a right to
ignore or not enforce sections of bills that he signs into law" and that President Bush had so
far issued 800 such statements, "more than all previous presidents combined").
25 But see United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1432 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting that
"Rule 413 is a federal rule, of course, and most federal procedural rules are promulgated
under the auspices of the Supreme Court and the Rules Enabling Act," but observing that
"we must recognize that Congress has the ultimate power over the enactment of rules, see
U.S.C. sec. 2074, which it exercised here").
26 See, e.g., Scallen, supra note 8, at 882-83 ("The crucial point is that this is the kind of
case-specific, fact-intensive balancing process that the drafters of Rule 403 thought should
be left to the one impartial expert in the courtroom-the trial judge.... The trial court in the
exercise of its discretion is more competent to judge the exigencies of a particular
case.... In this case, the district court is in a far better position than we to assess the
intangibles that are not conveyed well by a cold transcript: the persuasiveness of the young
victim's testimony; the success of defense counsel's efforts to undermine their credibility;
and the probative value the presentation of prior conviction would have had in the absence of
the mother's testimony." (citing United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1034 (9th Cir.
2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1181 (2002))).
Indeed, the same principle-that trial courts are in the best position to perform this
nuanced, fact-specific weighing of probative value against unfair prejudice, confusion, and
waste of time-has circumscribed appellate review of decisions under the general rule
regarding similar crimes evidence, FED. R. Civ. P. 404(b). See, e.g., United States v.
Jourdain, 433 F.3d 652, 659 (8th Cir. 2006) ("Giving great deference to the district court's
determination in balancing the prejudicial effect and probative value of evidence of other
crimes or acts, we will reverse the district court's evidentiary decision only when the
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Moreover, beneath this debate over institutional competency is a
foundational inquiry as to the nature of the rules themselves, and the
corresponding political and prudential question of which branch of
government is most competent to act with respect to those rules. 27 Much
turns on this prior question. The rules at issue may be viewed as
instantiations of a policy preference that places the public interest in
punishment of sexual offenses above the interest in accurate and just
adjudication (obtained, in part, by preventing the prejudicial use of prior
bad acts). 28 That determination would seem to belong to the legislature-
here, Congress-but only to the extent that it does not compromise
fundamental constitutional norms of due process or separation of powers.
If, however, the rules at issue do compromise constitutional norms, then
they are plainly invalid and the proper subject of judicial attention.
As it happens, the constitutional question is a fairly easy one as a
matter of law.29 The more difficult question arises when, as here, the rules
are indeed reflective of a considered legislative preference, but one that is
evidence admitted clearly has no bearing on any issue involved." (quoting United States v.
Claybourne, 415 F.3d 790, 797 (8th Cir. 2005))).
27 As I explain more fully below, this debate is best understood not as one of
constitutional power but of prudence, since it is plain that Congress has the power to
legislate in this area. See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934,
130 U. PA. L. REv. 1015, 1022 (1982) (noting that "[e]ven in the literature specific to the
proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, the arguments at times anticipated Congress's action by
obscuring the distinction between power and prudence in court rulemaking"); Enjady, 134
F.3d at 1432 ("[M]ost federal procedural rules are promulgated under the auspices of the
Supreme Court and the Rules Enabling Act. But we must recognize that Congress has the
ultimate power over the enactment of rules."). However, having broadly delegated that
power to the courts nearly a century ago, Congress has recognized the value of judicial
input-if not judicial control--of court rulemaking, and it would seem that a reversal of that
long-standing delegation is worthy of review.
28 Such an inference is plain from the statute of which the rules were a part, a federal
"tough on crime" statute entitled "Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act," which
contained a host of provisions addressing violent crime in general and violence against
women in particular. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-322 (1994). The statute, inter alia, expanded the Rape Shield Rule found in Rule 412 to
civil cases, made car-jacking a federal criminal offense, enhanced sentences for assaults that
could be characterized as "hate crimes," and provided the death penalty for a host of
federally prosecutable homicides including those relating to rape or child molestation. Id.
29 See infra text accompanying notes 62-64 (considering scholarly debate about power of
Congress and courts to promulgate procedural rules); see also Scallen, supra note 8, at 872-
73 (considering the question of "what is the constitutional ground upon which Congress
could enact a provision such as Rule 412 [the Rape Shield Rule]" and concluding that if it
were so substantive that the Supreme Court lacked the power to enact it, the rule could not
also "be said to be 'Necessary and Proper' to carry out Congress's power to [sic] 'To
constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme [sic] Court,"' and questioning whether Rule 412
is instead "the kind of substantive provision, unjustifiable under an enumerated
constitutional power, that is 'reserved to the States' under the tenth amendment").
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ordinarily governed by a judicially determinable inquiry about relevance,
probativeness, and prejudice. Returning to the autopsy photo hypothetical,
the question is: should all such questions be left to the judiciary, or is the
legislature wise to control or influence outcomes that hinge on such a
balance? What is the proper scope of judicial review under the guise of the
court's general supervisory authority, contained in Rule 403, when the
legislature has spoken so clearly? This Article explores that foundational
question.3 °
Second, this Article considers whether a rule of judicial discretion like
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 is the proper vehicle for reasserting judicial
preeminence in an interbranch power struggle such as the one I describe.31
While the judiciary enjoys the power to alter the distribution of powers
among the branches through its authority to adjudicate cases and
controversies arising under the Constitution,32 the use of an evidentiary rule
of discretion to curtail congressional rulemaking power raises its own issues
of legitimacy. This Article explores the justifications for invoking Rule 403
to limit the admissibility of similar acts in sex offense cases when Congress
has indicated that a rule of broad admissibility should ordinarily apply.
Finally, this Article reviews the decisional law of trial and appellate
courts presented with the question of the scope of their authority under Rule
403 to exclude that evidence made admissible by the new similar act rules,
concluding that although the approach that has emerged to date gives
adequate, if limited, play to judicial discretion, it does so without rooting
that exercise of discretion in the legitimacy analysis offered herein. Instead,
30 A third theoretical frame would characterize the historic exclusion of similar acts
evidence as constitutionally compelled and hence untrumpable by any legislative act, and
would, correspondingly, cast the courts as exclusive monitors of that constitutional interest.
See Orenstein, supra note 7, at 1505 & n.63-64. Such a theoretical frame has, however,
consistently been rejected by courts asked to treat the interest in exclusion of prior acts
evidence as constitutionally based. See infra Part V (decisions under 404 and 413).
31 This second question arises only after concluding, as courts have, that the judicial
response to the new rules is not constitutionally based.
32 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law or equity,
arising under this Constitution, [and] the laws of the United States .... ); see, e.g., Morrison
v. Olsen, 487 U.S. 654, 696 (1988) (approving Ethics in Government Act of 1978, which
created an office of Independent Counsel subject to limited oversight by Attorney General
and Congress); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983)
(invalidating "legislative veto" provisions for executive agency's rulemaking processes,
which veto could be accomplished by only one house of Congress, contrary to constitutional
requirements for legislation); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588-
89 (1952) (rejecting presidential assertion of power that Court deemed legislative in
character, in part for reasons of institutional competency); see also Yvette Barksdale, The
Presidency and Administrative Value Selection, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 273, 335 (discussing
separation of powers clashes and observing that some allocations of power are based upon
perceived institutional competencies).
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decisions under the new rules regarding similar acts evidence rest on a
superficial and textualist rationale and do not explore the deeper question of
authority that this clash between Congress and the courts evokes. I suggest
that future decisions grounded in this prudential and frankly political
analysis would enjoy greater coherence and legitimacy than those that rest
exclusively on interpretive tools such a plain meaning and other norms of
statutory construction. It would also legitimize a more robust exercise of
Rule 403 discretion to exclude prior bad acts in sexual assault cases than
has, to date, been applied under the new rules.
II. WHICH BRANCH BEST CONTROLS RULES OF PROCEDURE AND
EVIDENCE?
The question of which branch is best suited to promulgate rules of
evidence for application in civil and criminal trials has at least two possible
answers. Preliminarily, such rules, like the Rules of Civil Procedure and
the Rules of Criminal Procedure, were enacted by Congress, 33 and operate
as code with the force of law;34 as such, they are pieces of legislation and
ought, one would suppose, to originate with the legislative branch. 35
Certainly, since their enactment, the Rules of Evidence have been accorded
statutory authority and have been interpreted as would other legislatively
enacted statutes.3 6
3' H.R. REP. No. 93-650, at 3-4 (1973); see Edward J. Imwinkelried, Draft Article V of
the Federal Rules of Evidence on Privileges, One of the Most Influential Pieces of
Legislation Never Enacted: The Strength of the Ingroup Loyalty of the Federal Judiciary, 58
ALA. L. REv. 41, 44 (2006) (tracing history of the enactment of Federal Rules of Evidence).
34 Jonakait, supra note 6, at 552 n.6 ("[W]hile they are rules of procedure, they are also
statutes passed by Congress and signed by the President. The rules of evidence are indeed
statutes, but they are special statutes.").
35 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives."); Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 589 (noting "[t]he Founders of this Nation
entrusted the lawmaking power to the Congress alone in both good and bad times"); see also
Stephen Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1677, 1681
(2004) (noting that "[t]he lawmaking powers of Congress under Article I... enable
Congress to make prospective law throughout the broad field of procedure" and that "[t]his
has been the consistently held and oft-articulated view of the Supreme Court since at least
1825"). Professor Burbank observes that "[i]ndeed, the puzzle is not where Congress gets its
power, but rather, particularly in the case of supervisory court rules, how the exercise of
power to promulgate prospective, legislation-like rules can be squared with the grant of
Judicial power in Article III." Id. at 1682 (citation omitted).
36 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993) (stating that the
Supreme Court will "interpret the legislatively enacted Federal Rules of Evidence as [the
Court] would any statute"); Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 163 (1988);
Glenn Weissenberger, Are the Federal Rules of Evidence a Statute?, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 393,
393 (1994) (citing the foregoing cases and noting that when courts "look at the Rules, they
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On the other hand, as Professor Linda Mullenix observed with respect
to rules of civil procedure:
[F]or separation-of-powers purposes one may view the Rules Enabling Act as a
codification of the constitutional limits. The constitutional limitation prevents
Congress from compromising the constitutional independence of the judiciary by
invading the inherent power of the judiciary to create rules of practice and procedure
for the courts. The statutory limitation allocates the substantive law-making function
to the legislative branch, and the procedural rule-making function to the courts.
37
By this reasoning, Congress may not enact legislation that purports to
determine rules of procedure without violating separation of powers
principles, which principles the judiciary is charged with overseeing. Most
scholars and courts have found this argument insufficiently persuasive to
support the conclusion that Congress lacks the authority to enact rules of
procedure, even against the advice of the judiciary.38
Despite its power to act in the areas of procedure and evidence,
Congress chose to delegate its authority to the judiciary in its enactment of
the Rules Enabling Act, which provides that "[t]he Supreme Court shall
have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and
rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts (including
proceedings before magistrates thereof) and courts of appeals. '39 This
delegation is clear and unambiguous in its breadth, but has generated
ambiguity in interpretation of its scope, as defined by the phrase "rules of
practice and procedure." Those rules deemed to confer or infringe upon
substantive rights have been correspondingly invalidated as beyond the
judiciary's power to promulgate them pursuant to this delegation.4 ° In the
see a statute. And seeing a statute, they invoke a host of doctrines pertinent to interpreting
legislative enactments that have been developed by commentators and theorists outside the
sphere of evidence"); see also Imwinkelried, supra note 5, at 289 (noting that "[i]t is
imperative that any body of Evidence law accord the trial judge a significant measure of
discretion in applying the Rules").
37 Mullenix, supra note 19, at 1330.
38 United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1432 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting that "we must
recognize that Congress has the ultimate power over the enactment of rules, which it
exercised here" (citation omitted)); Burbank, supra note 35, at 1680-81 (contending that the
"[t]he inability to perceive (or acknowledge the importance of) [an array of] distinctions is
one reason why some discussions of the question, and in particular the role of the inherent
powers of federal courts, are so thoroughly unsatisfactory").
3' 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (1988); see Charles Gardner Geyh, Paradise Lost, Paradigm
Found: Redefining the Judiciary's Imperiled Role in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1165,
1187 n.l12 (1996) (citing Jack B. Weinstein, Reform of Federal Court Rulemaking
Procedures, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 905, 927-30 (1976) (noting that Congress "delegated its
rulemaking power almost entirely to courts since 1930s, leaving Congress in role of
monitor")).
40 See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1988) ("Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive right. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect
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course of acting under this grant of authority, the Judicial Conference of the
United States Supreme Court, through an ad hoc committee and, later,
through the advisory committee appointed to draft rules of evidence, twice
determined that rules of evidence were indeed "procedural" within the
language of the Enabling Act. 41 This self-affirming conclusion provided the
authority for promulgating the draft rules themselves.4 2
The authority to consider and frame rules regarding admissibility and
exclusion of evidence has, then, to the extent that such rules have been
regarded as categorically procedural rather than substantive in nature, long
been deemed to be peculiarly within the institutional competence of the
judiciary rather than the legislature.43 Rules of both procedure and evidence
after such rules have taken effect."); see also C.J. WARREN BURGER, COMMUNICATION FROM
THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING THE PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES, H.R. DOc. No. 93-46, at III (1st Sess.
1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting from draft submission).
Categorically, there has been a vigorous debate since the earliest precursors to the Rules
Enabling Act about whether the congressional delegation of rulemaking power was intended
to encompass rules of evidence. See Burbank, supra note 27, at 1129-30 n.516 (observing
that "rules of evidence were among the matters excluded from the rulemaking power in the
1926 Senate Report"); Geyh, supra note 39, at 1187 n. 116 (noting that "[w]hether rules of
evidence, particularly rules governing admissibility, modified a 'substantive right' and were
thus outside the purview of the judiciary's rulemaking authority had been a question debated
by judges and scholars alike") (citing Burbank, supra note 27, at 1137-43 (contending that
the difficulty has been a "failure to mark the distinction between rules regulating taking and
obtaining evidence (procedural) and rules regulating admissibility of evidence
(substantive)")).
Moreover, the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 transformed the rulemaking power of the
courts as set forth in the Rules Enabling Act to such a degree that at least one commentator
has argued that it "effectively overturns the Rules Enabling Act by the expedient of declaring
procedural rules to be substantive law, thus stripping the judicial branch of the power to
prescribe internal rules of procedure for the federal courts." Mullenix, supra note 19, at
1286.
41 Imwinkelried, supra note 33, at 45-47 (citing COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RULES OF EVIDENCE: A
PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE ADVISABILITY AND FEASIBILITY OF DEVELOPING UNIFORM
RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS, 30 F.R.D. 73 (1962));
COMM. ON THE RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURTS AND MAGISTRATES, 46 F.R.D. 161 (1969) (agreeing with ad hoc
committee that rules of evidence should be considered procedural, hence within the authority
conferred by the Rules Enabling Act).
42 See Scallen, supra note 8, at 852 (noting that the committee considering the question
"not surprisingly, concluded that it was both feasible and desirable to promulgate uniform
federal rules of evidence").
43 This authority was delegated by Congress to the Judiciary in 1934 through the Rules
Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (1990) (providing that "[t]he Supreme Court shall have
the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases
in the United States district courts (including proceedings before magistrates thereof) and
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have, for nearly a century, been drafted by members of the judiciary or their
appointed delegates, usually lawyers and legal scholars, and not by general
legislatures, either state or federal. 4 Despite the formal retention of veto
authority for such rules,45 for some forty years Congress did not see fit to
second-guess the judiciary and its appointees to the relevant committees
who drafted those rules.46
courts of appeals"). See also Imwinkelried, supra note 33, at 47 (noting that, by this Act,
"Congress delegated procedural rulemaking authority to the federal judiciary").
Many commentators have observed that the rules of evidence, compared to rules of
procedure, are especially substantive and therefore more acutely the focus of legislative
scrutiny. See Scallen, supra note 8, at 870 (noting that the "Evidence Rules have drawn
more flak than other rules of procedure, probably because the Evidence Rules are more
substantive than other procedural rules") (citing Gregory P. Joseph, The Politics of
[Evidence] Rulemaking, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 733, 750-51 (arguing that "the Rules of Evidence
are heavily outcome-determinative and do, in fact, affect substantial rights of litigants")).
44 28 U.S.C. § 2073(a)(2) (1988) (authorizing the Judicial Conference to appoint standing
committees to advise on the procedures for considering rules of practice, procedure, and
evidence, which committees "shall consist of members of the bench and the professional bar,
and trial and appellate judges"). Notwithstanding the adjudicative impact of conferring or
denying the existence of a privilege, such evidentiary consequences are just that, and are not
themselves the exclusive concern of the policymaker considering the question of privilege.
See infra Part II.C (discussing institutional competency of privilege rulemaking). But see,
e.g., Ted Schneyer, Who Should Define Arizona's Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege?:
Asserting Judicial Independence Through the Power to Regulate the Practice of Law, 48
ARIZ. L. REv. 419, 454 (2006) ("A substantial body of scholarship and case law has
addressed whether the judiciary or the legislature is the better policymaking branch to decide
whether to create evidentiary privileges and how broad they should be.").
4' 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (1988) (explaining congressional veto). Significantly, section 2074
provides that rules of evidence transmitted to Congress by the Supreme Court "shall take
effect" with no further congressional action, but that "[a]ny such rule creating, abolishing, or
modifying an evidentiary privilege shall have no force or effect unless approved by Act of
Congress."
46 But see Burbank, supra note 27, at 1018 & n.4 (noting that "[t]he long-enduring
pattern of congressional acquiescence in Federal Rules was broken in response to the
proposed Federal Rules of Evidence in 1973 and has not been reestablished") (citing 125
CONG. REc. H6376 (daily ed. July 23, 1979) (statement of Rep. Drinan that "[w]ithin six
years, postponing the effective date of proposed amendments to Federal Rules had become
'not a novel procedure')).
Professor Scallen catalogued the following substantive changes to the Rules of Evidence
since their enactment in 1975:
Rule 103 has been amended once (2000); Rule 404 has been amended twice (1991 and 2000);
Rule 407 has been amended once (1997); Rule 410 has been amended once (1975) and then
completely revised (1980); Rule 412 was added (1978) and amended twice (1988, 1994); Rules
413-415 were added (1995); Rule 609 was amended once (1990); Rule 701 was amended once
(2000); Rule 702 was amended once (2000); Rule 703 was amended once (2000); Rule 704 was
amended once (1984); Rule 705 was amended once (1993); Rule 801(d)(2) was amended once
(1997); Rule 803(6) was amended once (2000); Rule 804(b)(6) was added (1997); Rule 807 was
adopted to replace both Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) (1997); Rules 902(11) and 902(12) were
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Not surprisingly given this provenance, the rules of procedure and
evidence that have emerged are fundamentally different in character from
the acts of a general legislature. As one commentator put it:
The Federal Rules of Evidence have very little in common with a typical statute.
Most fundamentally, the Federal Rules of Evidence originated in, and were designed
by, the judicial branch and not the legislative branch. In addition, the role of Congress
in the process that generated the Federal Rules of Evidence was largely passive.
Congress's primary function was to enact into law the will and intent of the Supreme
Court and its Advisory Committee. Moreover, the judicial branch designed the
Federal Rules of Evidence to operate as guidance for the exercise of discretion within
the federal judiciary, and consequently, the Rules' intended function is very much
unlike that of most statutes.
47
That the special rules regarding similar acts evidence in sexual assault
and child molestation cases did not emerge from the process contemplated
and repeatedly employed by Congress via the Rules Enabling Act is itself a
red flag that the resulting rules have a political subtext 48 and that they might
not reflect the considered wisdom of those who preside over and practice
before courts.49 Does it also suggest that Congress intended the special
rules regarding similar acts in sexual assault cases to operate independently
added (2000); and all of the Rules were examined and altered, where necessary, to be gender-
neutral (1987), but some of them had to be corrected again the following year for clarification.
Scallen, supra note 8, at 855 (citing 21 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5008 (1977 & Supp. 2001)).
47 Jonakait, supra note 6, at 551 n.6 (citing Glenn Weissenberger, The Supreme Court
and the Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1307 (1992));
Scallen, supra note 5, at 1741; see also Geyh, supra note 39, at 1169 (noting that "[t]he
Rules Enabling Act of 1934 envisioned procedural rulemaking as an essentially technical
undertaking best left in the expert hands of judges, and for nearly forty years thereafter, the
judiciary exercised effectively exclusive rulemaking power").
48 See Scallen, supra note 8, at 855 (noting that the Rules of Evidence "have been a
continual source of controversy since their inception" and that the "most controversial of the
recent Evidence Rules changes was the addition of Rules 413-415").
49 See id. at 861 (noting that Rules 413-415 are "without precedent" in that they were
enacted "over the express disapproval of the Federal Rules Advisory Committee, without
empirical evidence of the enhanced reliability of this type of character evidence over other
similar character evidence for which no specific rules have been enacted, and without
demonstrated need in light of existing rules and practices" (citing Paul R. Rice, The Evidence
Project: Proposed Revisions to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 171 F.R.D. 330, 364 (1997))).
One result of this extraordinary procedural history is that there are no Advisory Committee
Notes for Rules 413-415. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK,
2007 FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE WITH ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTES AND LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY 108 (editor's note that "there is no Advisory Committee's Note for [Rules 413-
415]").
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of the body of rules whose provenance is so different? At least a few
commentators and courts have said yes.
50
The Rules Enabling Act can certainly be seen to represent a
determination by Congress that those who practice as judges and lawyers
are best suited to make the rules of procedure and evidence that apply in
those tribunals.5' It is a frank and complete delegation to the judiciary of
the legislative process with respect to such rules, with only a supervisory
approval role reserved for Congress itself. Indeed, during the period
immediately following its enactment, from 1934 to 1974, Congress was
entirely passive with respect to the Rules promulgated pursuant to the
Enabling Act, including their drafting, enactment, and occasional
amendment.52 It was not until 1973, when the Supreme Court submitted the
proposed Rules of Evidence to Congress, 53 that Congress reasserted its right
to act in this arena.54
5o Karp, supra note 13. But see Orenstein, supra note 7, at 1557-59 (arguing that
"[d]istrust of legislative history in interpretation is particularly apt when considering Rules
413 and 414").
51 This congressional judgment is very much a product of its time, resting, as one
commentator put it, "on the familiar axioms of the Progressive procedural ideology. The
trial is a scientific search for the truth, not a political method of resolving disputes. As such
it should be firmly under the control of the only unbiased expert in the courtroom-the trial
judge." Scallen, supra note 8, at 848 (citing 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 46, § 5005
at 79 (characterizing the conclusions of the Commonwealth Fund Evidence Committee
report of 1927)). But see 1988 Amendment of Rules Enabling Act (adding more legislative
input to the rulemaking process); Senate Judiciary Report on 1988 Amendment (setting out
the substance-procedure line); Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No.
100-702, 102 Stat. 4642 (codified as amendment to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072, 2074 (1988)).
52 See Imwinkelried, supra note 33, at 47 (noting that "[f]or forty years, Congress
passively acquiesced while the Supreme Court promulgated court rules without any
legislative intervention").
53 BURGER, supra note 40, at III; see also Geyh, supra note 39, at 1169 (noting that
judicial exclusivity "ended in 1973, when Congress suspended the proposed Rules of
Evidence" and that "[s]ince then, Congress has remained actively involved in procedural
rulemaking, frequently amending rules proposed or previously promulgated by the judiciary
and thereby heightening appreciably the level of interaction between the first and third
branches").
54 Congress rejected the Court's submission, passing a statute whose label itself revealed
the basis of congressional concern: Act to Promote the Separation of Powers by Suspending
Rules of Evidence, Pub. L. No. 93-122, 87 Stat. 9 (1973) (repealed 1988). See also Geyh,
supra note 39, at 1187 n. 116 (observing "that the substance-procedure distinction was at the
forefront of Congress's mind is reflected in the act suspending the proposed rules" and in the
fact that "Congress deferred the effective date of the rules with explicit reference to Justice
Douglas's dissent from the Court's decision to approve the rules" on the grounds that they
were "substantive in nature"); Burbank, supra note 27, at 1019 (noting that, after the
rejection of the proposed Rules of Evidence, "two of our most distinguished proceduralists
opined that federal rulemaking was 'in serious trouble' and 'in very deep trouble' (quoting
Charles Alan Wright, Book Review, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 652 (1978))); Proceedings of a
[Vol. 98
2007] STRUGGLE FOR R ULEMAKING PREEMINENCE 47
This episode is itself telling in its foreshadowing of the conflict over
Rules 413-415: many observers have noted that congressional disapproval
of the draft Rules of Evidence was centered on and exacerbated by the
proposed rules regarding privilege,55 and might not have been as intense
had the drafters avoided this minefield of interest politics with its long
56history of state legislative preeminence . As the Senate Judiciary
Committee explained, a number of commentators had "questioned the
wisdom of promulgating rules of evidence under the Rules Enabling Act,
on the ground that in their view, the codification of the law of privilege
should be left to the regular legislative process. ' 57 To the degree that the
interests at play in the debate about similar acts evidence can be likened to
the concerns that surrounded proposed federal privilege rules, the
institutional tensions between Congress and the courts are predictable and
Session of the Conference of Metropolitan District Chief Judges on Rules and Rule Making,
79 F.R.D. 471, 491-92 (1978) (remarks of Professor Arthur Miller)).
55 See Scallen, supra note 8, at 854 (observing that "[t]iming, they say, is everything,"
and that the proposed Rules of Evidence, "contain[ing] proposals for expanded governmental
privileges," were met with congressional hostility in no small part because of the unfolding
Watergate scandal, in which President Nixon sought to assert a broad executive privilege).
56 See, e.g., Rules of Evidence for United States Courts & Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183,
185 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas articulated the later congressional
resistance to the notion that rules of privilege were "procedural" within the meaning of the
Rules Enabling Act. See Imwinkelried, supra note 33, at 47 ("The Justice's criticism of draft
Article V set the stage for attacks that would be launched against the draft when the Court's
transmittal reached the Hill."); S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051 (characterizing rules as substantive).
Others, however, suggest that it was not merely the inclusion of rules of privilege that
provoked congressional reassertion of primacy in evidentiary rulemaking but that, instead,
"Congress was faithful to the original understanding [of the Rules Enabling Act] in refusing
to acquiesce in the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence in 1973." Burbank, supra note 27, at
1138.
" S. REP. No. 1277, at 56, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7053; see also id.
(enumerating areas of privilege law, including husband-wife, doctor-patient, secrets of state,
and newsman's [sic] privilege, that were "extremely controversial"). Others were concerned
that federal court enacted rules of privilege, to the extent that they trumped state privilege
rules, might be unconstitutional or "contrary to the concept of federalism." WEISSENBERGER
& DUANE, supra note 13, at § 501.1 n.2 (citing 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A.
BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 501.01 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed.
1997)).
Congress eventually resolved these concerns by stripping the privilege provisions out of
the proposed rules and substituting in their place a rule of decision that allows state privilege
law to control in those cases in which state law supplies the rule of decision of a federal case.
See FED. R. EVID. 501, HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., REPORT ON
ARTICLE V (Comm. Print 1973) (providing that federal common law shall control questions
of privilege except "in civil actions and proceedings with respect to an element of a claim or
defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision").
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deeply held.58 Correspondingly, to the degree that rules regarding similar
acts evidence can be conceptually distinguished from those regarding
privilege, the question of institutional competency and corresponding
preeminence should be answered quite differently.5 9
A second wave of congressional pushback in the area of rules drafting
occurred after the implementation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and
these Congress-enacted rules again focused on matters as to which there
was a congressional consensus that they were more substantive than
procedural.6 ° Since that time, there has been vigorous advocacy of the
notion that the substance-procedure line is illusory; that, as one scholar has
explained, it is impossible to assert "that civil process is normatively
" See infra Part II.C (discussing rules of privilege and separation of powers). The
success with which rules regarding similar acts, such as Rules 413-415, can be analogized to
rules of privilege might well determine the underlying validity of the assertion of
congressional power. To the degree that the rule regarding similar acts evidence operates as
a rule of exclusion of relevant evidence based upon some superseding policy interest
unrelated to adjudication, its rationale is legislative in nature, and its effect is
correspondingly substantive. Moreover, the treatment of similar acts evidence in cases
alleging sexual assault or child sexual abuse differently from the treatment of like evidence
in other kinds of cases also smacks of a legislative policy-driven rationale, rather than one
sounding in concerns about relevance or prejudice.
'9 See infra Part II.D (discussing similar acts evidence and its rationales). On balance,
however, a more persuasive argument can be made that the rule regarding similar acts
evidence in sexual assault cases is no more than a reversal of the historic ban on the use of
propensity evidence. Viewed as such, it is a usurpation of an appropriately judicial
determination of both logical relevance as well as of the balance of relevance against
competing institutional concerns regarding confusion and waste of time. Any competing
policy interest should be considered illegitimate as a matter of law, and a problematic
infringement on the due process rights of litigants.
60 See, e.g., Rules Enabling Act of 1988, 28 U.S.C. 2072(b) (1994); Civil Justice Reform
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 471-82
(1994)); Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(amending Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 by overriding presidential veto). But see
Geyh, supra note 39, at 1189 n.121 (noting some congressional "discomfort with legislative
intervention into the procedural rulemaking area" (citing H.R. REP. No. 889, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. 27 (1988), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 5987-88 (House Judiciary Committee
Report on 1988 Amendment to Rules Enabling Act, noting that the process "worked well for
many years"))).
Indeed, as to the Rules of Evidence themselves, it has been observed that "[i]f the Rules
had been adopted by the Supreme Court, they would be open to challenge on whether they
exceeded the Enabling Act." 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 46, § 5006 at 109 n.96.
There are instances in which state evidence law has been held to be sufficiently substantive
as to require its application in federal cases in which the court exercises diversity
jurisdiction. Scallen, supra note 8, at 870 (citing, inter alia, Hottle v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,
47 F.3d 106 (4th Cir. 1995) (excluding defendant's internal manuals under state law where
federal law would permit them)); Carota v. Johns Manville Corp., 893 F.2d 448 (1st Cir.
1990) (admitting evidence of settlement where permitted by Massachusetts rule and barred
by federal rule)).
[Vol. 98
2007] STRUGGLE FOR RULEMAKING PREEMINENCE 49
independent of substance, an idea that justified court rulemaking at its
inception and sustained it through much of [the twentieth] century. '61 Still
others contend that the Rules Enabling Act does not so much delegate
additional legislative power to the judiciary as it does codify those
rulemaking powers that the Constitution itself contemplated would be
exercised by the courts under Article 111.62 Nevertheless, Congress has
asserted that the power to promulgate rules of procedure is exclusively
legislative,63 even as that assertion has been dismissed as "nonsense. 64
61 Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic
Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 888-89 (1999) (characterizing the
"level of discontent" with the court-centered regime of rulemaking, with its "politically
unaccountable process" as "unprecedented in the sixty-five-year history of federal
rulemaking in the field of civil procedure" (citing, inter alia, Mistretta v. United States, 488
U.S. 361, 392 (1989) (observing that rulemaking is "substantive and political"))); see also
Linda S. Mullenix, Hope over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics
of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REv. 795, 837-55 (1991) (criticizing politicization of rulemaking
and expanded congressional involvement).
62 Burbank, supra note 27, at 1119 (noting that the 1926 Senate Report on the precursor
bill to the Rules Enabling Act "indicated that the ambit of rulemaking power conferred was
coextensive with the power the Court would have in the absence of enabling legislation"
(citing S. REP. No. 1174 (1926) (approving state statutes authorizing state courts to
promulgate rules of "practice and procedure" and noting that those state courts "have never
assumed to make rules relating to limitations of actions, attachment or arrest, juries or jurors
or evidence" and that "in using the words 'practice or procedure' Congress only intended to
confer the power to make such rules of practice and procedure as the court itself could make
without enabling legislation" (emphasis added))); see also Mullenix, supra note 19, at 1287
(arguing that the 1990 Civil Justice Reform Act, which created alternative mechanisms for
promulgating rules of court procedure, "revokes the Rules Enabling Act sub silentio and
authorizes unconstitutional rulemaking" and violates the separation-of-powers doctrine by
substantially impairing the federal courts' inherent Article III power to control their internal
process and the conduct of civil litigation," and arguing that "Congress is wrong in
declaring-as it does in the legislative history to the Act-that it has exclusive federal
rulemaking power"). But see Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 425 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting with
concern that Congress cannot properly delegate rulemaking authority it does not
constitutionally possess and that, by similarly improper reasoning, "[i]f an 'independent
agency' such as [the U.S. Sentencing Commission at issue] can be given the power to fix
sentences previously exercised by district courts, I must assume that a similar agency can be
given the powers to adopt rules of procedure and rules of evidence previously exercised by
this Court. The bases for distinction would be thin indeed"); Stephen B. Burbank, Sanctions
in the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Questions
About Power, 11 HOFSTRA L. REv. 997, 1005 (1983) (criticizing the proposition that courts
have inherent power to promulgate rules of procedure and noting that such inherent powers
should be exercised with restraint because they are shielded from direct democratic control);
Mullenix, supra note 19, at 1319 ("One will have difficulty grounding a separation-of-
powers argument against the Civil Justice Reform Act on an explicit assignment of judicial
power in Article III. Article III does not speak to the federal courts' rulemaking authority,
and the cases dealing with congressional delegations of power and modification of federal
court jurisdiction are largely unavailing in resolving the issue of the Act's legitimacy.").
63 S. REP. No. 416, at 9-12 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6811-15.
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A. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AS EVIDENCE OF INTERBRANCH CONFLICT
A brief overview of the process of rule enactment and amendment set
out in the Rules Enabling Act is warranted here in order to highlight the
very different provenance of the special rules regarding similar acts in
sexual assault cases. Not only did Congress not delegate the drafting of
such rules to the Supreme Court's Judicial Conference and its constituent
committees, but Congress actually drafted these rules on its own and then
enacted them in the teeth of explicit opposition from that body to
Congress's fait accompli.65 It would be hard to imagine a more complete
repudiation of the Rules Enabling Act's design for delegation of rulemaking
authority.66 Accordingly, it is somewhat surprising that courts confronted
by these special rules regarding similar acts in sexual assault cases, and
mindful of their unique legislative history, have not chafed under their
implementation in the trials they oversee.67
64 Mullenix, supra note 19, at 1326 ("[T]he Senate Judiciary subcommittee's claim in the
legislative history to the Civil Justice Reform Act that Congress has exclusive rulemaking
power is nonsense. This assertion blatantly ignores the British historical antecedents to
American procedural reform, the federalists' concern with ensuring institutionally the
existence of an independent judiciary, and over two hundred years of practical experience
with judicial rulemaking. Our constitutional history demonstrates that from the earliest days
of the republic, while Congress has exercised consistently its legislative authority under
Article III to constitute the inferior federal courts, and to confer on them procedural
rulemaking authority, it has not engaged in procedural rulemaking itself and can hardly lay
claim to an exclusive constitutional claim to do so.").
65 See REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 13; see also Major Bruce D.
Landrum, Military Rule of Evidence 404(b): Toothless Giant of the Evidence World, 150
MIL. L. REv. 271, 352 (1995) (observing that "[a]t about the same time, the American Bar
Association House of Delegates adopted a resolution opposing the new rules of evidence"
(citing Myrna S. Raeder, American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section Report to the
House of Delegates, 22 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 343 (1995))). Major Landrum explains that
[t]he Judicial Conference submitted its report, exactly 150 days after enactment, on February 9,
1995. Recommending that Congress reconsider its decision to change the rules at all, the report
also provided alternative amendments to Rules 404 and 405, designed to achieve congressional
intent without the "drafting ambiguities" and "possible constitutional infirmities" noted in the
new rules.
Id. at 311.
66 One commentator has described the pedigree of these rules as "remarkable," observing
that "Congress suspended the effective date of the rules it enacted for 150 days in order to
permit Judicial Conference review, thereby effectively turning the Rules Enabling Act
(which calls for a seven-month suspension of Supreme Court-approved rules, pending
congressional review) on its head." Geyh, supra note 39, at 1190 n.128; see also Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 320935(a), 108
Stat. 2135 (establishing nisi period for rules to take effect).
67 See infra Part V (considering cases).
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1. The Rules Enabling Act Process
The delegation of power to the Supreme Court in the Rules Enabling
Act is clear and complete: it provides that "[t]he Supreme Court shall have
the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of
evidence for cases in the United States district courts (including
proceedings before magistrates thereof) and courts of appeals. 68
Ordinarily, under the process designed by the Act, the Judicial Conference
authorizes the appointment of a standing committee on rules of evidence
which reviews recommendations regarding those proposals and makes
recommendations to the Judicial Conference. 69 The Act further provides
that the Supreme Court:
shall transmit to the Congress not later than May 1 of the year in which a rule
prescribed under section 2072 is to become effective a copy of the proposed rule.
Such rule shall take effect no earlier than December 1 of the year in which such rule is
so transmitted unless otherwise provided by law.
70
That is, rules promulgated under this process need only be transmitted to
Congress to become effective; Congress's role is a passive one.7 '
Since the enactment of the Rules Enabling Act, hundreds of rules and
amendments to rules have taken effect through precisely this process, with
the judiciary taking the active role and Congress passively acquiescing.
Such a history would be likely to, and in fact did, create a political culture
of entitlement on the part of the judiciary that prefigured its response to
Congress's assertion of greater autonomy in the area of rulemaking.
2. The Legislative History of Rules 413-415
Rules 413-415 were enacted as part of a larger anti-crime initiative, the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 .72 Prior versions
of the amendments appeared as early as 1991, in the Women's Equal
Opportunity Act bill, and later, in the 102nd and 103rd Congresses, in the
68 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (1988).
69 28 U.S.C. § 2073(b). Subsection (d) of that provision requires that the standing
committee "provide a proposed rule, an explanatory note on the rule, and a written report
explaining the body's action, including any minority or other separate views." 28 U.S.C.
§ 2073(d).
7' 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (emphasis added).
71 Id. The sole exception to this automaticity pertains to rules of privilege, for which the
Act requires an affirmative approval by Congress. 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b) ("Any such rule
creating, abolishing, or modifying an evidentiary privilege shall have no force or effect
unless approved by Act of Congress."). Such an affirmation by Congress underscores the
unique status of rules of privilege in the substance-procedure debate that has pervaded the
history of the Act. See infra Part II.C.
72 Pub. L. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796; 1994 Enacted H.R. 3355; 103 Enacted H.R. 3355.
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Sexual Assault Prevention Act bills, all sponsored by Representative Susan
Molinari and Senator Robert Dole. 3 The Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act was adopted on September 13, 1994, and became
effective on July 9, 1995, 150 days after the Judicial Conference of the
United States fulfilled its obligation under the congressional directive to
"transmit to Congress a report containing recommendations for amending
the Federal Rules of Evidence as they affect the admission of evidence of a
defendant's prior sexual assault or child molestation crimes in cases
involving sexual assault and child molestation. 74  The Act explicitly
provided that "[t]he Rules Enabling Act shall not apply to the
recommendations made by the Judicial Conference" in the report it was
75ordered to prepare. Instead, although the Act contemplated and even
compelled a report from the Judicial Conference, it also anticipated that, in
the event that the recommendations contained in the report "[were] different
than the amendments" made under the Act, the language of the Act "shall
become effective 150 days after the transmittal of the recommendations
unless otherwise provided by law.",76 That is, Congress provided itself with
a 150-day nisi period in which to respond to judicial input, but with a
default of automatic enactment in 150 days.77 This statutory posture was
hardly calculated to demonstrate to the Judicial Conference how eagerly its
recommendations were anticipated by Congress, and stands in marked
contrast to the procedures contemplated by the Rules Enabling Act itself.
The Judicial Conference Report that resulted from this Act indicated
that, although its review was compressed into the 150-day period allotted
by Congress, it was nevertheless "thorough. 78  The Report recited its
mandate from Congress to prepare a secondary report, diplomatically
characterizing it as an "invitation," while also observing that, by that Act,
"[c]onsideration of Rules 413-415 by the Judicial Conference was
specifically excepted from the exacting review procedures set forth in the
Rules Enabling Act. ' 79 Before making its substantive recommendations,
73 See Statement of Rep. Molinari, supra note 7.
74 WEISSENBERGER & DUANE, supra note 13, at 846.
" Pub. L. 103-322, § 320935(c), cited in WEISSENBERGER & DUANE, supra note 13, at
846.
76 Id. § 320935(d)(2). The Act provided that if the recommendations of the report of the
Judicial Conference were in accord with the Act, they would take effect thirty days after
transmittal. Id. § 320935(d)(1).
77 See Statement of Rep. Molinari, supra note 7, at 8991 (stating that "regardless of what
the Judicial Conference may recommend, the new rules will take effect within at most 300
days of the enactment of this legislation, unless repealed or modified by subsequent
legislation").
78 REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 13, at 849.
79 Id.
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the Judicial Conference explained that the amendments had been reviewed
by the Advisory Committees on Criminal, Civil, and Evidence Rules and,
later, by the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure (Standing Committee), and that "[t]he overwhelming majority of
judges, lawyers, law professors, and legal organizations who responded
opposed" the new rules.80  Similarly, the Advisory Committees on
Criminal, Civil, and Evidence Rules were "unanimous except for a
dissenting vote by the representative of the Department of Justice.""1
Turning to the merits of the proposed amendments, the Report
recommended that the new rules not be enacted but that, instead, "Congress
reconsider its policy determinations" underlying the proposed rules. 82 The
Judicial Conference concluded that the concerns "expressed by Congress
and embodied in new Evidence Rules 413, 414, and 415 are already
adequately addressed in the existing Federal Rules of Evidence," in
particular Rule 404(b). s3  The Report explained that Rule 404(b)
appropriately allowed the use of prior acts for a long list of non-propensity
uses, but that a different rule allowing broader use of prior acts posed a
significant "danger of convicting a criminal defendant for past, as opposed
to charged, behavior or for being a bad person.,8 4 The Report observed that
the new rules also posed the threat of "mini-trials within trials concerning
those acts" that were not the subject of a conviction, and that the rules were
inconsistent with "protections [against the use of such evidence that] form a
fundamental part of American jurisprudence and have evolved under long-
standing rules and case law."85
Notwithstanding the "highly unusual unanimity" and breadth of these
objections, the Report nevertheless recognized the political reality that
"Congress [might] not reconsider its decision on the policy question., 86 In
that apparently likely event, the Judicial Conference proposed an alternative
form for the new rules, by which they would fit within existing exceptions
to the use of character evidence, such as those rules allowing proof of
character of the defendant and character of the victim. 87  In the Note
80 Id.
81 Id. at 849-50.
82 Id. at 851.
83 Id. at 850.
84 Id. The Report observed that the new rules were "not supported by any empirical
evidence," and that they "could diminish significantly the protections that have safeguarded
persons accused in criminal cases and parties in civil cases against undue prejudice." Id.
85 Id.
86 id.
87 Id. at 851. The Report recommended that the new rules appear as subsection (4) to
existing Rule 404(a). Rather than announcing a general rule of admissibility "on any matter
to which [they are] relevant," the Report recommended that the new rule should require that
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accompanying these alternative changes, the Judicial Conference suggested
that "[t]hese modifications do not change the substance of the congressional
enactment," but that the changes were instead designed:
to integrate the provisions both substantively and stylistically with the existing Rules
of Evidence; to illuminate the intent expressed by the principal drafters of the
measure; to clarify drafting ambiguities that might necessitate considerable judicial
attention if they remained unresolved; and to eliminate possible constitutional
infirmities.
88
This tactful language did not persuade Congress, and the proposed rules
were enacted in their original form. 89
B. RULES OF EVIDENCE IN GENERAL
A plausible argument can be made that the determination of what
evidence ought properly to be heard in adjudicatory proceedings is best
made by those charged with the general supervision of trials, namely
judges.90 Indeed, there is a compelling argument that federal courts enjoy
the power to make such rules even in the absence of congressional
prior act evidence be "otherwise admissible under these rules" and should "expressly
enumerate" the factors to be weighed in determining the "probative value" of a prior act of
sexual assault or sexual molestation:
(i) proximity in time to the charged or predicate misconduct;
(ii) similarity to;
(iii) frequency of the other acts;
(iv) surrounding circumstances;
(v) relevant intervening events; and
(vi) other relevant similarities or differences.
FED. R. EVID. 413. This language made plain that the determination of admissibility in the
revised formulation offered by the judiciary was to be made by trial courts pursuant to Rule
403's standard of weighing probative value against the risk of unfair prejudice and other
values.
88 REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 13, at 852. The language regarding
"constitutional infirmities" apparently referred to the expressed concern that, if the proposed
rules were read as mandatory, unconstrained by either the hearsay rules or rule 403, "serious
constitutional questions would arise." Id. at 852-53.
89 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-322, 108 Stat.
1796.
90 See Geyh, supra, note 39, at 1169 (noting that the Rules Enabling Act manifested a
belief that procedural rulemaking was "an essentially technical undertaking best left in the
expert hands of judges"); see also Bone, supra note 61, at 888 (observing that "[tihe ideal of
nationally uniform procedural rules promulgated by the Supreme Court after consideration
by expert committees-commonly known as 'court rulemaking'-has been the cornerstone
of civil rulemaking in the federal courts since adoption of the Rules Enabling Act in 1934").
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delegation of that power.9' In part, this is due to the procedural dimension
of such rules, which distinguishes them from typical legislative concerns
and recognizes judges' role as experts.92 In addition, as a practical matter,
because of their somewhat arcane nature, it had historically been difficult,
notwithstanding their urgency from a judicial perspective, to attract
sustained legislative attention to the procedural concerns of courts.
93
This generalization masks a more nuanced recognition of the many
different agendas to which rules of evidence are directed. Rules of
evidence cover topics as wide as logical relevance,94 the balance of
probative and prejudicial values, 95 the exclusion of relevant evidence for
91 See Burbank, supra note 27, at 1088-89 (quoting S. REP. No. 1174 (1926) (concluding
that "Congress only intended to confer the power to make such rules of practice and
procedure as the court itself could make without enabling legislation...")).
92 Some have suggested that this recognition of judicial expertise in the realm of
procedural rules and the corresponding retreat of Congress from the area had its genesis with
Dean Roscoe Pound's speech to the American Bar Association in 1906, entitled "The Causes
of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice":
The difficulty of procuring legislative action with reference to even the most crying needs of
judicial procedure is notorious. Legislatures today are so busy ... that it is idle to expect [them]
to take a real interest in anything so remote from newspaper interest, so technical, and so
recondite as legal procedure.... When a judicial council or a committee of a bar association
comes to a court with a project for rules of procedure, they will not have to call in experts to tell
the judges what the project is about .... When rules of procedure are made by judges, they will
grow out of experience, not the ax-grinding desires of particular lawmakers.
Quoted in Geyh, supra note 39, at 1186 & n.101; see also Bone, supra note 61, at 888
(questioning whether the court rulemaking process enjoys contemporary democratic
legitimacy, and noting that "[u]nder the pressure of these changing views, court rulemaking
has moved toward a legislative model and away from the traditional model based on
reasoned deliberation and expertise"); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of
Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REv. 2085, 2089 (2002) (noting that "the federal
rulemaking process.... combines the expertise of the courts with the democratic legitimacy
of Congress").
93 See Jack Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court: A Contemporary
Crisis, 27 STAN. L. REv. 673, 675 (1975) (noting congressional indifference to rulemaking
proposals); Mullenix, supra note 19, at 799 (noting "widespread ennui regarding judicial
rulemaking"); see also Geyh, supra note 39, at 1186.
Other commentators do not see the issue as one of congressional disinterest:
[A]s the discussions of Rule 704(b) [the Hinckley Amendment] and Rules 413-415 demonstrate,
the problem is not Congress's lack of interest in rulemaking. Congress clearly has an interest in
the evidence rules when it serves a political constituency. Indeed, the essential problem with
Congressional involvement in rulemaking is that the judicial branch does not appear to have the
influence it ought to have with Congress on the subject of federal rules of practice and
procedure.
Scallen, supra note 8, at 864.
94 FED. R. EviD. 401, 402.
95 FED. R. EVID. 403.
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reasons unrelated to probativeness, 96 the assessment of the credibility of
witnesses, 97  the admissibility of lay and expert testimony,98  the
authentication of evidence, and rules of privilege. 99 It would be difficult
indeed to assign identical rationales of institutional competence to courts or
legislatures with respect to so broad an array of rules. A more cogent
understanding of the primacy of court or legislature must, accordingly, turn
on the particular thrust of the rule at issue.
Moreover, it has been widely recognized that, unlike their true
statutory cousins, the rules of evidence generally operate as broad
statements of guidance of judicial discretion.100 Although this has created
difficulties with respect to the interpretation of the rules, it underscores the
preeminent role of courts in the determination of questions of
admissibility.1 ' In order to be effective, consistent, and just, trial courts
must be permitted to exercise their discretion in a manner that is attuned to
the factual exigencies of individual cases.'0 2
96 See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 407 (subsequent remedial measures); see also infra text
accompanying note 115.
97 FED. R. EVID. art. VI.
98 FED. R. EVID. art VII.
99 FED. R. EvID. art. V.
100 Jonakait, supra note 6, at 551 (observing that "evidence law gives wide discretion to
trial courts, with the result that the Rules of Evidence are more a draft of general principles
than a code like other statutes" (citing Imwinkelried, supra note 5, at 289 ("It is imperative
that any body of Evidence law accord the trial judge a significant measure of discretion in
applying the Rules. No matter how hard they try, the drafters of any evidence code can
never anticipate all the variations of the record that a trial judge will encounter."))); David P.
Leonard, Power and Responsibility in Evidence Law, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 937, 956-57 (1990)
("[R]ulemakers have recognized the unique position of the trial judge, who observes the
context in which particular evidentiary issues arise and who is therefore in the best position
to weigh the potential benefits and harms accompanying the admission of particular
evidence."); Thomas M. Mengler, The Theory of Discretion in the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 74 IOWA L. REv. 413, 457 (1989) ("[T]he Federal Rules of Evidence are intended
to provide some guidance to trial courts and litigants, but cannot be consulted for the
definitive answers to many questions."); cf Victor J. Gold, Do the Federal Rules of Evidence
Matter?, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 909, 919 (1992) ("[Courts have] recogniz[ed] discretion
where it does not exist or expand[ed] discretion beyond the scope granted .... ).
101 Weissenberger, supra note 47, at 1307 ("[T]he judicial branch designed the Federal
Rules of Evidence to operate as guidance for the exercise of discretion within the federal
judiciary, and consequently, the Rules' intended function is very much unlike that of most
statutes.").
102 See Scallen, supra note 8, at 875 (noting that "Congress needs to let trial judges do
their jobs without undue interference" and that "the drafters of the Evidence Rules built a
substantial amount of discretion into those rules in order to 'empower,' in the clich6 of
today's world, trial judges to deal with new or unforeseen or case-specific problems they
encounter" (citing HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 179 (1958) ("Discretion is a vehicle of
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Preliminarily, pure questions of relevance are subject to rational
analysis 10 3 and, in fact, the general authority to admit evidence that is
relevant assigns to the trial judge the determination of that logical
problem. 0 4 In addition, Rule 403 stands as a general rule of exclusion of
evidence, even if relevant, where that evidence poses a "danger of unfair
prejudice" or imposes other administrative burdens such as confusion,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.10 5 None of
these determinations invites legislative input, since neither preliminary
relevance nor the balancing of probative value against unfair prejudice or
other administrative concerns are inquiries that touch upon interests outside
the adjudicatory process itself.
C. RULES OF PRIVILEGE
Rules of privilege are unique among rules of evidence in their capacity
to exclude relevant information from the consideration of the trier of fact
for reasons unrelated to probativeness, and rooted instead in interests that
might be said to be best weighed by legislatures. For this reason, it was
rules of privilege that provoked the congressional rebellion against the
forty-year autonomy of the courts to promulgate rules of procedure. 0 6
Notwithstanding one's view as to the procedural nature of other rules of
good far more than of evil. It is the only means by which the intelligence and good will of a
society can be brought to bear directly on the solution of hitherto unsolved problems."))).
103 See generally David Crump, On the Uses of Irrelevant Evidence, 34 HOUSTON L. REv.
1, 3-4 (1997) (observing that the "Federal Rules of Evidence are liberal in admitting
evidence with low probative value," that the definition of relevance under the Rules "is
impossibly broad if taken literally," but that this "low level of vigilance about minimal
probative value can be justified if the concern rarely arises in practice").
104 Federal Rule of Evidence 401 allows that "[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible,
except as provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these
rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority.
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." This threshold determination of
admissibility is, according to the Rules, controlled by the court. FED. R. EVD. 104(a)
(stating that "[p]reliminary questions concerning.., the admissibility of evidence shall be
determined by the court...").
10s FED. R. EVID. 403; Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 188 (1997).
Importantly, only where probative value is "substantially outweighed" by these enumerated
concerns does the trial court have the authority to exclude relevant evidence. FED. R. EVID.
403; see also Scallen, supra note 8, at 880-81 (contending that there should be no special
balancing rule or presumption of admissibility for similar acts evidence offered under Rules
413-415, since Rule 403 "is already 'tilted' in favor of admissibility" by its use of the word
"substantially," contrasting the special balancing tests contained in Rule 609 regarding
impeachment by conviction).
106 See Act to Promote the Separation of Powers by Suspending Rules of Evidence, Pub.
L. No. 93-122, 87 Stat. 9 (1973) (repealed 1988); supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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evidence, one might well reach a different conclusion about rules of
privilege.
Commentators have disagreed about which branch is best suited to
promulgate rules of privilege. While there is some concern that legislatures
acting in this area will confer privileges on those with greatest access to
legislative power, who have the political influence to obtain extraordinary
treatment, 10 7 there is also a concern that courts will discount the importance
of protecting confidential relationships in their quest for all relevant
evidence. 108 As one scholar explained the legislative preeminence position:
[T]he legislature has the comparative advantage because formulating privilege law
involves a balancing of public policies which should be left to the legislature. A
compelling reason is that while courts ... find it easy to perceive value in public
policies such as those favoring the admission of all relevant and reliable evidence
which directly assist the judicial function of ascertaining the truth, it is not their
primary function to promote policies aimed at broader social goals more distantly
related to the judiciary. This is primarily the responsibility of the legislature.
10 9
Not surprisingly, those jurists charged with drafting rules of evidence,
the Advisory Committee, viewed privileges as "hindrances" which should
be curtailed and accordingly believed that any "privileges contained in the
rules of evidence [ought to] be narrow."" 0
In the end, Congress resolved the tension surrounding the federal-state
conflict regarding rules of privilege by enacting Rule 501, which operates
107 See, e.g., 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2286 (McNaughton
revision 1961), at 532-36 (expressing this concern about how privileges are conferred). One
law professor testifying at the House Subcommittee on the draft rules of evidence explicated
Wigmore's position that "many statutory privileges are the product of effective lobbying by
special interest groups which simply want the prestige of a privilege." Imwinkelried, supra
note 33, at 46 (citing Rules of Evidence: Hearings Before the Spec. Subcomm. on Reform of
Fed. Crim. Laws of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 74, 555-56 (1973) (statement of
Edward W. Cleary)); see also Scallen, supra note 8, at 867-68 (noting that one former
member of the Evidence Rules Advisory Committee "expressed a well-founded concern
about opening the door to Congress to codify privilege law ... suggest[ing] that members of
Congress are likely to stuff the Evidence Rules with privileges favored by all sorts of special
interest groups").
108 See, e.g., CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 75, 282 (John Strong
ed., 4th ed. 1992) ("It may be argued that legitimate claims to confidentiality are more
equitably received by a branch of government not preeminently concerned with the factual
results obtained in litigation and that the legislatures provide an appropriate forum for the
balancing of the competing social values necessary to sound decisions concerning
privilege.").
109 Schneyer, supra note 44, at 454-55 (citing People v. Sanders, 457 N.E.2d 1241, 1245
(Ill. 1983)).
110 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 46, § 5422 at 685 (quoting 2 JACK WEINSTEIN &
MARGARET BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 501-12 (1975), cited in Imwinkelried, supra
note 33, at 46 & n.47).
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as a rule of decision, rather than attempting to codify rules of privilege
within the Rules of Evidence.' 11 However, the legislative-judicial conflict
with respect to such rules was unambiguously resolved in favor of the
courts, to whom Congress delegated the power to create, eliminate, and
modify privileges through their common law decisions "in the light of
reason and experience."' 1 2  If a second delegation were necessary, in
addition to that contained in the Rules Enabling Act, this would seem to be
it.
D. SPECIALIZED RULES OF EXCLUSION
Much of what can be said about judicial competence to determine rules
of admissibility in adjudication 13 loses its force when the rules at issue are
rules of exclusion of relevant evidence. In this respect, such rules are much
closer to rules of privilege in that they represent a policy interest, unrelated
to adjudication, that a democratically constituted legislature has found to
trump the adjudicatory interest in having all relevant evidence available to
the finder of fact. 114  So, for example, the rule regarding subsequent
111 Rule 501 provides that:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by Act of
Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the
privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be
governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the
United States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings,
with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of
decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof
shall be determined in accordance with State law.
112 Id.
113 See supra text accompanying notes 101-06.
114 The debate about which branch is best suited to frame rules of privilege has been
particularly vigorous. See, e.g., Schneyer, supra note 44, at 454 (observing that "[a]
substantial body of scholarship and case law has addressed whether the judiciary or the
legislature is the better policymaking branch to decide whether to create evidentiary
privileges and how broad they should be" (citing MCCORMICK, supra note 108, at 282 ("It
may be argued that legitimate claims to confidentiality are more equitably received by a
branch of government not preeminently concerned with the factual results obtained in
litigation and that the legislatures provide an appropriate forum for the balancing of the
competing social values necessary to sound decisions concerning privilege.")); 8 WIGMORE,
supra note 107, § 2286 at 532-36 (suggesting that legislatures too often confer privileges on
powerful occupational groups seeking to protect their particular interests)). As Professor
Schneyer explains:
There is a sharp disagreement, largely because participants in the debate tend to emphasize one
side of the privilege equation and disregard the other. Those who argue that the judiciary is the
better policy maker are preoccupied with the cost side-the loss of evidence that privileges cause
in legal proceedings. In Professor Edmund Morgan's view, for example, privilege law should be
set by the judiciary because privileges are nothing more or less than privileges to suppress the
truth, and no officers of any department of government, other than the judiciary, have the
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remedial measures is designed to incentivise repair of dangerous conditions
at the expense of potentially relevant information on the issue of fault or
negligence. 15  Similarly, the rule regarding offers in compromise is
designed to incentivize settlement negotiations and comes at the cost of
potentially relevant evidence on the issues of fault or damages." 6  That
these decisions are driven by a frank weighing of competing policy interests
suggests legislative, rather than judicial, preeminence. Indeed, a contrary
balance would raise concerns about democratic legitimacy, given the very
limited opportunity for input in the judicial rulemaking process."'
This analysis only explains the phenomenon of legislative
preeminence with respect to rules of exclusion; Rules 413-415 operate as
exceptions to a rule of exclusion, but do not themselves compel admission
constant opportunity to observe them in operation and the skill to determine how far and in what
respects they interfere with the orderly and effective administration of justice. For others,
however, the salient point about privileges is their capacity to foster valuable social relationships,
e.g., doctor-patient relationships, that thrive on confidentiality. According to the Illinois
Supreme Court, for example, the legislature has the comparative advantage because formulating
privilege law involves a balancing of public policies which should be left to the legislature. A
compelling reason is that while courts . . . find it easy to perceive value in public policies such as
those favoring the admission of all relevant and reliable evidence which directly assist the
judicial function of ascertaining the truth, it is not their primary function to promote policies
aimed at broader social goals more distantly related to the judiciary.
Id. at 454-55.
115 See FED. R. EVID. 407 (excluding evidence of "measures that, if taken previously [to a
harm or injury] would have made the injury or harm less likely to occur... [if offered] to
prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect in a product's design, or a need for a warning or
instruction"); see also FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory comm. note (observing that "[t]he rule
rests on two grounds. (1) The conduct is not in fact an admission, since the conduct is
equally consistent with injury by mere accident or through contributory negligence.... (2)
The other, and more impressive, ground for exclusion rests on a social policy of encouraging
people to take, or at least not discouraging them from taking, steps in furtherance of added
safety" (citing Judson F. Falknor, Extrinsic Policies Affecting Admissibility, 10 RUTGERS L.
REV. 574, 590 (1956))); see, e.g., Thais L. Richardson, Comment, The Proposed Amendment
to Federal Rule of Evidence 407: A Subsequent Remedial Measure That Does Not Fix the
Problem, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1453, 1454 (1996) (observing that Rule 407 "departs from the
liberal policy of admissibility embodied in the Federal Rules of Evidence by advancing the
social policy of encouraging people to take steps in furtherance of added safety by freeing
them from the fear that such steps will be used against them in a future lawsuit").
116 FED. R. EviD. 408 (excluding "[elvidence of(i) furnishing or offering or promising to
furnish or (2) accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in
compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to validity or
amount [if offered] to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount"); see also
FED.R. EvID. 408 advisory comm. note (observing that, like Rule 407, the rule rests on two
grounds, one of relevance, and the other and "more consistently impressive ground[,]
promotion of the public policy favoring the compromise and settlement of disputes").
117 Bone, supra note 61, at 889 (noting the argument of critics of judicially drafted rules
that "rulemaking is 'political' and therefore legitimate in a democracy only with broad
public participation and accountability").
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of any particular evidence, and indeed cannot do so without falling afoul of
constitutional due process concerns." 8 Instead, the rules regarding similar
acts in sexual assault cases ought to be viewed as restoring this class of
similar acts evidence to the status quo ante regime of Rules 401 and 403,
requiring that evidence be relevant and that its probative value not be
outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.' 19
The question, then, is not whether Congress can place certain categories of
evidence beyond the scope of a rule of exclusion, but instead whether it can
direct the courts to reduce the level of judicial scrutiny under these two core
rules.
E. RULES 404, 413,414, AND 415: A SPECIAL CASE
A harder question is how to view the rule of exclusion embodied in
Rule 404 and later trumped by Congress in Rules 413-415. The prohibition
against the use of propensity evidence in Rule 404120 may be viewed in a
number of different ways, only some of which track the rationale and effect
of other miscellaneous rules of exclusion contained in Article IV of the
Rules. While, as a matter of structure, Rule 404 tracks those other rules of
exclusion, prohibiting the use of similar acts evidence if offered for a
certain purpose and then enumerating other, permissible uses of that same
evidence, it need not be viewed as rooted in the kinds of conduct incentives
that, for example, rules relating to subsequent remedial measures or offers
in compromise represent. Instead, the rationale behind the long-standing
rule excluding similar acts evidence has usually been described as
manifesting a specific instance of the concerns broadly embraced by Rule
403.121 As Justice Jackson famously explained in Michelson v. United
States:
118 See United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1433 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting that
"without the safeguards embodied in Rule 403 we would hold [Rule 413] unconstitutional").
119 FED. R. EvID. 401, 403.
120 That rule provides that "[e]vidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not
admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular
occasion," and then lists certain exceptions. FED. R. EvID. 404(a). The prohibition is
expanded and repeated later in the rule: "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may however be admissible for other purposes .. " FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
121 Additionally, rules of exclusion, such as those regarding subsequent remedial
measures or offers in compromise, do not prove what a jury might assume they prove, and
hence they too are instances of categorical weighing of probative value against unfair
prejudice, confusion, and waste of time. However, that these rules function as incentives to
conduct unrelated to the adjudicatory process places them peculiarly within the sphere of
legislative preeminence.
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The state may not show the defendant's prior trouble with the law, specific criminal
acts, or ill name among his neighbors, even though such facts might logically be
persuasive that he is by propensity a probable perpetrator of the crime. The inquiry is
not rejected because character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too
much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general
record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge. The
overriding policy of excluding such evidence, despite its admitted probative value, is
the practical experience that its disallowance tends to prevent confusion of issues,
unfair surprise and undue prejudice.
12 2
For example, one rationale for the propensity ban has been the
recognition that similar acts evidence is, logically, so minimally relevant
that its probative value is, as a matter of law, unlikely to outweigh its
prejudicial effect if presented to jurors. 23 Such a rationale sounds within
Rule 403's balancing frame, rather than being categorical in the way of
other specific rules of exclusion, and therefore seems an improbable fit
within the legislative, interest-balancing sphere.
A different rationale for the propensity ban, that it invites the finder of
fact to punish the offender for conduct unrelated to the crime charged,
raises due process concerns that are also best left to the protection of the
courts rather than the legislature. Each such situation is factually unique,
and the process of weighing the relative value of evidence of a particular
prior bad act against its potential to tempt a jury to punish for the act rather
than the crime charged can hardly be done prospectively by a legislature.
12 4
Yet another rationale is rooted in the administrative concerns that Rule
403 polices: there is a risk, with similar acts evidence, of a confusing mini-
122 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948) (footnotes omitted), cited in Old Chief v. United States,
519 U.S. 172, 181 (decided after the enactment of Rules 413-415); see also Spencer v.
Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 560-61 ("The rules concerning evidence of prior offenses are complex,
and vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but they can be summarized broadly. Because
such evidence is generally recognized to have potentiality for prejudice, it is usually
excluded except when it is particularly probative in showing such things as intent; an
element in the crime; identity; motive; a system of criminal activity; or when the defendant
has raised the issue of his character, or when the defendant has testified and the State seeks
to impeach his credibility.") (citations omitted).
123 See, e.g., Susan Estrich, Teaching Rape Law, 102 YALE L.J. 509, 519 (1992)
(observing that "[tihe danger with such evidence is not that it proves so little, but that it may
prove too much").
124 See Orenstein, supra note 7, at 1550 (observing that "[w]hen federal appellate judges
give district court judges abstract instructions about how prior sexual offense balancing tests
should come out, they are sending those judges the wrong message," since they should
instead be told to "engage in a specific balance, considering various factors that might
mitigate against the probative value or exacerbate the unfair prejudice"); see also People v.
Frazier, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 100, 109 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (noting that "a jury might punish the
defendant for his uncharged crimes regardless of whether it considered him guilty of the
charged offense especially where.., the uncharged offenses ... were much more serious
than the charged offense").
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trial in which the jury will be asked to resolve questions about the factual
sufficiency of the similar act allegation in order to make use of such
evidence for the permissible purposes enumerated by Rule 404(b). 125
Again, an assessment of the administrative burden of these mini-trials
seems essentially judicial, not legislative. The judgment cannot be made
categorically, but instead depends upon the totality of the circumstances of
a particular case.126 If this is the basis of the rule regarding similar acts,
then it seems as a prudential matter to lie outside the institutional
competency of a legislature.
Only in those instances in which propensity evidence is offered for
some non-propensity purpose, such as (but not limited to) those purposes
listed in Rule 404(b), may the court exercise its discretion under 403 to
weigh the non-propensity use against other competing concerns about
prejudice and confusion or waste of time. 127 Rules 413-415 do not purport
to create an additional non-propensity use of similar acts evidence in sexual
assault cases, but instead reiterate the baseline evidentiary rule of 402 that
125 See, e.g., Roger C. Park, Symposium: Character at the Crossroads, 49 HASTINGS L.J.
717, 746-47 (1998) (noting that "given limited resources, there is good reason to hesitate
before opening the door to expensive, adversarially-generated evidence of dubious probative
value"); see also Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 689 n.6 (1988) (holding that the
jury may not consider similar acts evidence as bearing on the crime charged unless it finds to
a preponderance that the defendant did in fact engage in the conduct that is the subject of
that evidence). The difference in the burden of proof that obtains in determining the
sufficiency of the evidence of a similar act (preponderance) and the sufficiency of the
evidence of the crime charged (proof beyond a reasonable doubt) poses an additional risk of
juror confusion, and burdens the court with the need for additional jury instructions. But see
Orenstein, supra note 7, at 1544-49 (suggesting that the Huddleston standard of proof to a
preponderance for similar crimes evidence ought not to apply to evidence offered pursuant to
413-415, but that the higher standard of proof-clear and convincing-more accurately
ensures appropriate use of such evidence). Any threshold other than proof beyond a
reasonable doubt invites the risk of confusion to which judicial discretion under Rule 403 is
directed.
126 See, e.g., United States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326, 1332 (10th Cir. 1998) (affirming
trial court's exclusion of similar acts evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 413 where "jury will be
required to evaluate expert testimony regarding the medical propriety of each examination to
determine whether [defendant gynecologist] acted within the scope of his patients'
consent").
127 FED. R. EVID. 404(b); see, e.g., Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 681 (discussing admissibility
of similar acts evidence and noting that the Rules Advisory Committee "indicated that the
trial court should assess such evidence under the usual rules for admissibility: 'the
determination must be made whether the danger of undue prejudice outweighs the probative
value of the evidence in view of the availability of other means of proof and other factors
appropriate for making decisions of this kind under Rule 403' (quoting Advisory
Committee's Notes on FED. R. EvID. 404(b), 18 U.S.C. App., at 691)); see also id. at 688
(stating "it is anticipated that with respect to permissible uses for such evidence, the trial
judge may exclude it only on the basis of those considerations set forth in Rule 403, i.e.,
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time" (quoting S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 25 (1974))).
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"all relevant evidence is admissible," 128 including propensity evidence, if it
is propensity for sexual assault or child molestation.
1 29
For all these reasons, it seems plain that similar acts evidence is better
conceived as presenting an array of problems that are best addressed by a
flexible balancing rule such as Rule 403, and that they do not fit the model
of specific rules of exclusion that might appropriately be the subject of a
categorical legislative policy choice. Accordingly, the susceptibility of any
subset of similar acts evidence to a categorical rule of admissibility seems
highly doubtful.
Indeed, in order to conceive of the similar acts rules as within the
special competency of Congress, like other specialized rules of exclusion,
one would have to make an extraordinary contortion of reasoning. Other
rules in Article IV require the exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence,
because the cost of admitting it would be borne in areas unrelated to the
adjudication but that are the appropriate subject of legislative concern. 130
The similar acts rules set out in 413 and 414 purport to compel admission of
evidence; the impact of erroneous admission is felt entirely within the
adjudicatory process with no corresponding extra-judicial interest furthered
by the rules' application.131 Accordingly, it is inaccurate to claim that the
rules are a legitimate exercise of legislative interest-balancing.
III.THE RELATIONSHIP OF RULE 404(B) To RULE 403
Structurally, the Rules of Evidence provide that, except in certain
circumstances,132 proof of character is prohibited unless it is offered for a
128 FED. R. EVID. 402.
129 The theory behind this difference in treatment of similar crimes evidence in sexual
assault and child molestation cases is one that is not borne out by empirical evidence that
there is a higher recidivism rate for these crimes justifying the use of a propensity inference
by the finder of fact. Cf REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 13. See also
Lannan v. State, 600 N.E.2d 1334, 1336-37 (Ind. 1992) (rejecting lustful disposition
exception to propensity rule noting that "[i]f a high rate of recidivism cannot justify a
departure form the propensity rule for drug defendants, logic dictates that it does not provide
justification for departure in sex offense cases").
130 Again, the concern about property owners making all necessary repairs, or the
concern about the number of cases being taken to trial rather than settled or resolved by a
guilty plea, are two clear examples of this legislative interest-balancing. See FED. R. EVID.
407, 408, 409.
131 The interest, such as it is, in "getting tough on crime" cannot be offered as a
legitimate legislative interest since linking the means (requiring admissibility of prior crimes
evidence) and the end (more convictions) requires the occasional if not frequent conviction
of individuals based upon prejudicial reasoning.
132 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1) (character of accused); 404(a)(2) (character of
victim); 404(a)(3) (character of a witness).
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purpose other than propensity. 133 If, however, evidence of similar crimes is
offered for a purpose other than proving character and propensity, then that
evidence is subject to the weighing provisions of Rule 403.
IV. USING RULE 403 AS A TOOL FOR RECALIBRATING THE DISTRIBUTION
OF RULEMAKING AUTHORITY AMONG POLITICAL BRANCHES
Whatever may be said about courts' institutional supremacy in the area
of evidentiary rulemaking in general, or rulemaking regarding similar acts
evidence in particular, an independent issue arises when considering the
courts' use of Rule 403 to remedy what might be perceived as legislative
overreaching 134 in that area. The directive of Rules 413-415-that similar
acts evidence be admitted in cases of sexual assault and sexual harassment
"on any matter to which it is relevant" 135-makes no reference to any other
rules of evidence,1 36 and, in particular, does not expressly invite courts to
apply Rule 403 to such similar acts evidence. This omission has been the
subject of some judicial attention, 137 but is not itself determinative of the
availability or scope of judicial discretion to exclude similar sexual assault
acts evidence under Rule 403.13 Instead, the theoretical inquiry should be
as to whether a rule of discretion, which is what Rule 403 purports to be,
can also serve as a tool for recalibrating the balance of rulemaking power
between the legislative and judicial branches.
If Congress acted properly within its sphere of expertise in drafting
Rules 413-415, then the use of Rule 403 to limit admissibility of similar
acts evidence that those rules make admissible would seem to be an abuse
133 See FED. R. EVID. 404(a) ("[e]vidence of a person's character or a trait of character is
not admissible for the purpose of proving character in conformity therewith on a particular
occasion").
134 1 repeat that the overreaching to which I refer is not a matter of power but of
competence and therefore prudence.
' See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 413. Similar language appears in the corresponding
provisions of Rules 414 and 415. FED. R. EvID. 414(a), 415(a) (making such evidence
"admissible... as provided in Rule 413 and Rule 414 of these rules").
136 Cf FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1) (stating that rape shield evidence "is admissible, if
otherwise admissible under these rules" and within a list of specific exceptions). The
presence or absence of such language referring to other sections of the Rules has been one
factor relied upon by courts in determining the availability and scope ofjudicial discretion to
exclude similar acts evidence under Rule 403. See infra Part V.
137 Those Courts of Appeals that have considered this drafting omission have uniformly
concluded that Rules 413-415 are nonetheless subject to other rules of evidence, including
Rule 403. See infra Part V.
138 See id. (reviewing cases).
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of discretion that, intentional or not, thwarts Congress's legitimate decision
to make such evidence broadly admissible. 
139
If, on the other hand, Congress erred in rescinding properly delegated
judicial authority to promulgate rules of procedure and in attempting to
control the particularistic concerns about probative and prejudicial uses of
evidence by means of a categorical rule of admissibility, then the use of
Rule 403 to place similar acts evidence in sexual assault cases on a similar
evidentiary footing to such evidence in other kinds of cases seems both
necessary and appropriate.
140
V. JUDICIAL DECISIONS UNDER RULES 413-415: AN EXERCISE IN
RESTRAINT
Since the enactment of the special rules regarding the admissibility of
similar acts evidence in cases of sexual assault and child sexual abuse, a
significant number of decisions have been entered that purport to reconcile
the language of those rules with the Rules of Evidence as a whole, and Rule
403 in particular. 141 Yet none of these decisions has considered the scope
of courts' Rule 403 discretion as informed by the fundamental prudential
question of competence that should, it would seem, be at the heart of the
question. Instead the decisions have been superficial in that they regard the
scope of discretion under 403 as determined solely by the language of that
rule and that of the special rules regarding similar acts. This fundamentally
textualist approach to the question can only be partially satisfactory.
Moreover, decisions in several of the circuits have read Rules 413-415
to imply a presumption of probativeness that is more difficult to trump with
concerns about unfair prejudice than similar acts evidence that is offered
pursuant to Rule 404(b). 142 This presumption of probativeness skews the
139 Of course, if 413-415 are read to preclude any judicial review of potential prejudice
from the admission of similar acts evidence, then the concern would be constitutional in
nature, hence within the court's competence as well as its authority. Instead, this discussion
presumes that the question is not whether similar acts evidence in sexual assault cases is
subject to 403 weighing, but to what degree 403 review should limit the admissibility of
such evidence.
140 See supra note 62.
141 A LexisNexis search reveals that Rule 413 has been cited by federal courts in 134
cases; Rule 414 has been cited in 124 cases; and Rule 415 has been cited in 43 cases.
142 See, e.g., United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1433 (10th Cir. 1998) (arguing "the
exclusion of relevant evidence under Rule 403 should be used infrequently, reflecting
Congress's legislative judgment that the evidence 'normally' should be admitted"); United
States v. LeCompte, 131 F.3d 767, 768 (8th Cir. 1997) (applying Rule 403 to Rule 413 to
"loosen to a substantial degree the restrictions of prior law on the admissibility of such
evidence"); United States v. Meacham, 115 F. 3d 1488, 1492 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting "the
courts are to 'liberally' admit evidence of prior uncharged sex offenses").
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403 balance in the bulk of cases under Rules 413 and 414 in those circuits
without offering a satisfactory explanation for the difference in treatment of
similar acts evidence in sexual assault cases, other than the fact that
Congress acted to promulgate those rules.1 43 A more persuasive rationale
might rest upon the inherent superiority of Congress to draft rules that
govern the balance between probativeness and prejudice; without
demonstrating or even positing such institutional superiority, however,
there is little compelling reason for the thumb on the scale that courts have
assigned to similar acts evidence under Rules 413 and 414.
Typical of appellate courts' analysis of evidence under the special
similar act rules is the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Mound.144 There, the court held that
there was "no inherent error in admitting under Rule 413 evidence that
would be inadmissible under Rule 404(b): that is the rule's intended
effect." 145  Moreover, the court relied on the Rule's dubious legislative
history to conclude that "the risk of unfair prejudice-in light of Rule 413's
'underlying legislative judgment... that [such evidence] is normally not
outweighed by any risk of prejudice or other adverse effects'-was
small." 146 Although the court distinguished evidence of a prior act that was
143 See supra text accompanying note 105 (explaining that Rule 403 itself already "tilts"
the balance in favor of admissibility by requiring admission of evidence unless risks
"substantially outweigh" probative value (citing Scallen, supra note 8, at 880-81)).
144 149 F.3d 799 (8th Cir. 1998).
141 Id. at 802.
146 Id. (quoting 140 CONG. REc. H8992); see also United States v. Larson, 112 F.3d 600,
604 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that the Rule 403 balance is skewed in favor of admissibility
(quoting Senator Dole ("The presumption is that the evidence admissible pursuant to these
rules is typically relevant and probative, and that its probative value is not outweighed by
any risk of prejudice.") (alternation in original))). But see United States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d
1326, 1331 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that Rule 413 "contains no language that supports an
especially lenient application of Rule 403" reasoning that "courts apply Rule 403 in
undiluted form to Rules 404(a)(l)-(3), the other exceptions to the ban on propensity
evidence").
The legislative history has been described as "rather unusual" in its elevation in a lecture
by a Department of Justice official at the annual conference of law professors to
"authoritative" status. Statement of Rep. Molinari, supra note 7 (citing Karp, supra note 13
(announcing that it should be treated "as part of the authoritative legislative history of Rules
413-415")); see Orenstein, supra note 7, at 1558 ("[T]he legislative history in this instance is
truly troubling both in its content and origin. There is strong reason to doubt the integrity of
how Congress generated the legislative history of the new rules. Statements made from the
floor of the House and the Senate by the main sponsors of the new rules have a surreal
sameness about them, mimicking the actual language and arguments of David Karp's law
review article."); see also Scallen, supra note 8, at 877-78 & n.164 ("I suspect that it is
beyond the wildest dreams of most authors to be 'authoritative in the sense of having the first
and last word on the meaning of a piece of legislation."' (citing Johnson v. Elk Lake Sch.
Dist., 283 F.3d 138, 155 n.10 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that although "relying on the work fo a
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not sufficiently "similar" as Rule 413 requires, holding that such evidence
was properly excluded by the trial court, it affirmed the trial court's
decision to admit a prior act that was factually similar to the crime
charged. 147
The Mound court, like other courts presented with this question, did
not explain how a determination of the risk of prejudice in a particular case
can be foreordained by a categorical congressional judgment. 48  It also
failed to broach the question of the power or propriety of Congress's act
arrogating to itself the responsibility for balancing concepts of probative
value and prejudice that is assigned to the courts by Rule 403 and the long
pre-Rules history of judicial control of questions of relevance and
admissibility. By omitting these critical inquiries and their resolution, the
Mound court produced a decision that is frustratingly unmoored to any
coherent principles of institutional competence or constitutional structure. 149
Notably, the Mound court determined the scope of the trial court's
discretion under Rule 413 by reference to the Rule's language ("similar
acts") and self-serving legislative history (the testimony of the Department
of Justice spokesman and of the Rules' sponsors), 150 and paid virtually no
non-legislator is a somewhat unusual method of establishing legislative history, it is not
entirely unknown"))). The slavish invocation of the comments of Mr. Karp as authoritative
and binding is particularly puzzling when one considers the deep and unanimous opposition
of both bench and bar to the rules. REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 13;
Raeder, supra note 65.
147 Mound, 149 F.3d at 802; see also Elk Lake Sch. Dist., 283 F.3d at 156 (holding that,
in a civil case in which prior acts were offered under Rule 415, a presumption of
admissibility of such acts is "overly simplified"; that only if the prior act is both
demonstrated with "specificity" and "sufficiently similar to the type of sexual assault
allegedly committed by the defendant" should a court conclude that Congress "intended for
the probative value of the evidence to outweigh its prejudicial effect," but that where these
factors were missing, "its probative value is reduced and it may prejudice the jury unfairly,
confuse the issues, mislead the jury, and result in undue delay and wasted time-all reasons
for excluding evidence under 403").
148 See also Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 2195, at *14
(Feb. 26, 2008) ("Relevance and prejudice under Rules 401 and 403 are determined in the
context of the facts and arguments in a particular case, and thus are generally not amenable
to broad per se rules.")
149 Equally unsatisfying are the decisions of those courts that reject the presumption of
admissibility in the legislative history of Rule 413, but nevertheless resolve the question of
the scope of Rule 403 review by reference to the text, not the function, of the Rules of
Evidence. See, e.g., Guardia, 135 F.3d at 1331 (noting that "courts apply Rule 403 in
undiluted form to Rules 404(a)(1)-(3), the other exceptions to the ban on propensity
evidence"). If only these decisions would set out the institutional rationale for a robust
review under Rule 403, regardless of the preliminary determination of relevance, their
decisions would carry the weight of logic rather than mere interbranch rivalry.
150 See also Karp, supra note 13, at 19 ("The underlying legislative judgment is that the
sort of evidence that is admissible pursuant to proposed Rules ... is typically relevant and
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attention to the broader foundational question of which branch of
government ought to determine questions about the probativeness or
prejudicial effect of categories of proof, or about the balance between
probativeness and prejudice in any particular case. Plainly, returning to the
hypothetical that opened this paper, if there had been a "legislative
judgment" (of similarly dubious pedigree) that autopsy photos should be
admitted on any matter to which they might be relevant (tracking the
language of Rule 413), no court would presume that such photos no longer
carried the risk of unfair prejudice that they have always been understood to
present to juries. No court would, in the face of such a "legislative
judgment," abandon its role as gatekeeper assessing the evidentiary value of
any particular autopsy photo against the risk of prejudice that it posed in a
particular case. That is in large part because courts have long held
unchallenged preeminence on discretionary questions framed by Rule
403;151 no "legislative judgment" in this area, especially one so plainly
against the grain of historical practice and logical reasoning with respect to
a category of proof like autopsy photos, would trump that judicial role and
cause the courts to accept the crabbed 403 review that they have acquiesced
to in the area of similar acts evidence in sexual assault cases.
To date, only one court has recognized the inappropriateness of
acquiescing in this way to a "diluted" form of Rule 403 review for similar
acts evidence in sexual assault cases. In United States v. Guardia, the
Tenth Circuit held that Rule 413 "contains no language that supports an
especially lenient application of Rule 403" reasoning that "courts apply
Rule 403 in undiluted form to Rules 404(a)(1)-(3), the other exceptions to
the ban on propensity evidence."' 52 This analogy to long-standing rules that
permit proof by propensity with respect to character of the accused and
character of the victim, acting as true exceptions to the rule of exclusion set
forth in Rule 404(a) and 404(b), demonstrates with clarity that the Mound
probative, and that its probative value is normally not outweighed by any risk of prejudice or
other adverse considerations.") (citing unpublished analysis statement).
The Report of the Judicial Conference, quoted extensively supra Part II, is also part of
the legislative history, and explicates some of the interbranch prudential questions that lie at
the heart of the resolution of questions about Rule 403's scope. It was unanimously
supported by all participants save those from the Department of Justice. Nevertheless, the
Mound court did not appear to factor those portions of the legislative record into its decision.
11 See also Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 2008 U.S. LEXIS 2195, at *14 ("With respect to
evidentiary questions in general and Rule 403 in particular, a district court virtually always is
in the better position to assess the admissibility of the evidence in the context of the
particular case before it.")
15' 135 F.3dat 1331.
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court's deference to the "legislative judgment" as a justification for
constricting its own 403 review is entirely unwarranted. 15
3
Even the Guardia court fails to grapple with the larger question of
political power and preeminence in the rulemaking arena that is presented
by the clash of Rule 413 and Rule 403. Using equally textualist tools to
align Rules 413-415 with other exceptions to the propensity ban, the
Guardia court did not explain or even consider why it is preferable for
courts to weigh similar acts evidence under the broad discretionary standard
of Rule 403 rather than submit such evidence to the categorical rule of
admissibility enacted by Congress.
VI. CONCLUSION
Having demonstrated that the special rules regarding the admissibility
of similar acts evidence in cases of sexual assault are within the sphere of
special competence of the judiciary, as recognized by Congress in the Rules
Enabling Act, the corollary conclusion follows, that admissibility of such
evidence ought properly to be constrained by a robust application of Rule
403.
153 Indeed, the fact that the rules' sponsors understood that "the rules do not impose
arbitrary or artificial restrictions on the admissibility of evidence," Statement of Rep.
Molinari, supra note 7, is a far cry from compelling the admission of such evidence. That
Congress announced that "the presumption is in favor of admission," id., is as true of similar
acts evidence as of any other relevant evidence under the "liberal thrust" of the rules, see, for
example, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993), but tells
courts nothing at all about the very different question of how to balance probative value
against unfair prejudice.
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